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THOMAS CHRISTIAN PAEFGEN*

Institutional Investors Ante Portas:

A Comparative Analysis of an
Emergent Force in Corporate
America and Germany
In both the United States and Germany institutional investors hold a large
proportion of the common stock of publicly traded companies. In the United
States in 1990 institutional investors held 43 percent of all publicly traded common stock, 52 percent of the top fifty U.S. companies, and over 60 percent of
eight of them with one outlier at over 75 percent. 1 Projections for the turn of this
millenium foresee a further increase of institutional ownership in the magnitude
of two-thirds. 2 The lion's share will likely be taken by the exponentially growing
private and public pension funds.
In Japan the percentage is even higher. An empirical study in 1984 reveals that
roughly 70 percent of the common stock of large Japanese enterprises is held by
institutional investors and other companies. 3 In recent publication, the investment
banking powerhouse Nomura Securities has predicted that during the next five years
investment capital will more than double, accumulating to $1.2 trillion.
*Rechtsreferendar, 1982, Higher Regional Court of Diisseldorf; Assessor, 1986, Bavarian Ministry
of Justice; Doctor of Jurisprudence, 1988, University of Munich; M.B.A., 1989, INSEAD (Fontainebleau); LL.M., 1990, University of Chicago; Rechtsanwalt in Munich and Attorney-at-Law
(New York).
1. See C. K. BRANCATO & P. R. GAUGHIN, THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN U.S.

CAPrTAL MARKETS 21 (1988) (published in November of that year by the Institutional Investor
Project, which was established by the Center for Law and Economic Studies at the Columbia
University School of Law in collaboration with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)).
2. Id. at 20.
3. See Steven Barber, A Close Circle of Friends, INSTIT=rHONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1991, at 35.
For an in-depth analysis of the distribution of share capital in Japanese corporations, see Maeda,
Kabunushi no Kigyo Shihai to Kantoku [Management and Management Control by the Shareholders], 3 GENADI K]GYo Ho KOZA [LEcruiRs ON CURRENT CORP. L.] 191-95 (1985). A similar
panoramic overview of what has occurred in France is provided by P. Collin, Qui est l'actionnaire
aujourd'huiet d quel mobile r~pond-il?, REVUE DE DRorr DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALFS [REV. DR.

AFF. INT'L] 437-40. (1989).
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In contrast, the role of institutional investors in the German stock market is of
less significance. Some members of the financial community have deplored this
phenomenon. They interpret it as proof of the underdevelopment of the German
stock market. 4 Nevertheless, the fact is that an ever increasing trend towards
concentration in the economy exists. Currently, between 150 and 200 truly
multinational companies are competing in the world market. The world market
also features a markedly growing tendency towards an institutionalization of
corporate ownership. In this context it is apt to distinguish between national and
foreign investors.
Within the first group, domestic public investment funds carry the lowest
weight. A total number of thirty-one enterprises, which adhere to the Federal
Association of German Investment Companies (Bundesverband Deutscher Investmentgesellschaften), manage 132 public funds with globally diversified portfolios. But fund capital amounts only to DM 16.6 billion; the big chunk lies with
the insurance companies, the pension and death benefit funds, as well as professional benefit funds. For example, according to the quarterly released statistics of the Federal Commission for the Supervision of the Insurance Industry
(Bundesaufsichtsamt ffir das Versicherungswesen), the insurance sector had
amassed securities worth DM 667.4 billion at the end of 1989. Compared with
the previous year the increase amounted to DM 53.7 billion. During the first six
months of 1989, however, the size of new investments in corporate stock was
rather modest. The life insurance companies that traditionally have the biggest
need for investment opportunities, spent only DM 2.6 billion for the acquisition
of stock. This figure breaks down to DM 1.5 billion for direct acquisitions and
the remainder for indirect investments through special funds. Although, at first
glance, this number appears to be a quantitg negligeable, the amount gains a
in German
larger dimension when compared to the net growth of cash infusions
5
corporations in 1989, which amounted to only DM 7.3 billion.
Foreign institutional investors are on a much faster growth track. The Federal
Bank of Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank) explains why:
In light of the excellent profitability of German publicly traded companies, the, according to international standards, relatively low P/E ratio on this market and the
continuously favourable macroeconomic prospects increasingly placed German corporate stock in the focus of attention of foreign institutional investors. 6

4. See Helmut Guthardt, Pensionskassen und Borse, 43 WERTPAPIERMITEILUNGEN [WM]
1789-96 (1989); K. H. Schneider-Gidicke, Die Bbrse im Umbruch, 43 ZErrscHRiFr FUR DAS GESAMTE KREDrrWESEN [ZfgK] 336, 340 (1990).
5. MONTHLY REPORT OF THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, June 1991, at 57. The same number for
1990 is DM 7.3 billion. See MONTHLY REPORT OF THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, July 1991, at 57. The
total market capitalization of all issued common shares of German publicly traded corporations amounted
to about DM 586 billion in June 1991. STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE MONTHLY REPORT OF THE
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, SERIEs 2, STATISTICS ABOUT THE SECURrrIES MARKET, July 1991, at 41.
6. MONTHLY REPORT OF THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, March 1990, at 18. More recent development during the second half of the last decennium is summarized in MONTHLY REPORT OF THE
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK,
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A second element was, of course, the growth of funds in the hand of foreign
institutional investors searching for first-class investment opportunities.
Those two factors contributed to a major transfer of ownership from domestic
to foreign owners, whereas the latter took part in new stock issues to a much
lesser extent. The annual report for 1989 displays the concern with which the
Bundesbank observes this development:
In contrast to the growing readiness of national investors for long-term fixed income
investments, the year 1989 was disappointing insofar as the private investor community
could not be mobilized for long-term oriented stock purchases. In fact, the domestic
nonfinancial segment reduced its holdings
7 of German dividend yielding securities by
net sales in the value of DM 18 billion.
This statement, however, comes as no surprise to the experts of the German
capital market. The decline of the private sector is an ongoing trend over at least
the last two decades, which has not yet consolidated at a base level. Whereas in
1965, 27 percent of corporate stock was held by private investors, in 1985 the
number shrank to only 17 percent. 8 On the other hand, the Bundesbank reports
that under the lead of institutional investors
foreign stock acquisition climbed to
9
a new all-time high of DM 23.3 billion.
In total, foreign institutional investors are alleged to hold close to a 20 percent
stake in corporate Germany. However, this average figure is somewhat misleading because most of the holdings are clustered around a limited number of sixty
to seventy corporations with a broadly dispersed share capital. In those companies, absent a predominating major shareholder, the aggregated institutional
holdings are far above the average. It will only be a matter of time, if not already
reality, before the institutional holdings add up to the majority.
When analyzing each company one must not be deceived by the impressive
numbers of small shareholders. Commerzbank AG, Frankfurt/M., for example,
which after the recently completed takeover of Vereins- und West-Bank AG,
Hamburg, by Bayerische Vereinsbank AG, Munich,' ° fell back to the fourth
7. REPORT OF THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK FOR THE YEAR 1990, at 4. This concern did not
vanish in 1990, since the REPORT OF THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK FOR THE YEAR 1990, at 58, is
clouded with skepticism:
Domestic non-banks took theopportunity of lower stock prices for large purchases, whilst at the sametime foreign
investors increasingly switched sidesto the selling parties on the market. Whether the enhanced holdings express
the macroeconomically desirable willingness for long-term investments remains to be seen.In theface of the active
demand for option instruments in their various forms that is likely to be motivated by speculation, there arecertain
doubts as to drawing this conclusion.

8. See Michael Hauck, FRANKFURTER

ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG,

June 13, 1987.

9. See supra note 6. This figure does not capture the increase of active investments which
amounted to DM 4.3 billion in 1989.
10. See 43 ZfgK 830 (1990). For a survey of the ten biggest credit institutions in 1986 and 1988
see MONOPOLKOMMISSION,

HAUPTGUTACHTEN 1988/1989. VETTBEWERBSPOLITIK VOR NEUEN HERAUS-

1991, at 161 (tbl. 8). Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale (WestLB) which, in terms of total assets (DM 153.1 billion), holds the fifth
position after Deutsche Bank AG (DM 274.2 billion), Dresdner Bank AG (DM 211.8 billion),
Commerzbank AG (DM 168.8 billion) and Bayerische Vereinsbank AG (DM 153.9 billion) (see id.)
has emerged from an amalgamation of the central transfer bank (Girozentrale) and the state bank
(Landesbank) of the Federal State (Land) Northrhine-Westphalia in 1972. WestLB is publicly owned
FORDERUNGEN. MONOOLKOMMISSION, HAUPTGUTACHTEN
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position among the private universal banks, is proud to count 190,000 stock
owners. Yet, when allocating the total outstanding share capital to institutional
and private investors, it turns out that 42 percent are owned by the former group
and 58 percent by the latter." Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt/M., follows a
similar pattern. 297,000 private shareholders share 56.4 percent of the bank's
equity capital of DM 2.2 billion, whereas the remainder is kept in the deposits
of 7,300 institutional investors. This apportionment shows a significant increase
of institutional holdings2 by 4 percent, largely attributed to the enhanced demand
for investment funds.'
An even more striking example is VEBA AG, Disseldorf, a far-flunged conglomerate with interests in the energy and chemical industry as well as in retail
business. Of the 543,000 shareholders, 97 percent are regarded to be private
individuals. However, they own merely 30.5 percent of the common stock.
Nearly 55 percent is held by domestic and foreign institutional investors. Particularly, the foreign quota has increased from 23 percent in 1986 to 43 percent
in 1990 after the successive privatization of VEBA AG. 13
The growing financial participation of institutional investors raises the question
whether it has a symmetric impact on the corporate decision-making process. Particularly in the United States, institutions have been seeking a greater say in the
affairs of companies in which they invest. The agenda consists of three essential
issues where they claim the right both of consultation and codetermination: not only
fundamental decisions, but also business policy and day-to-day operations; recruitment and promotion of key personnel; and the distribution of profits. 14
The underlying thrust of the aforementioned list is the (partial) reunification of
ownership and management. What was lauded by Berle and Means 15 more than
half a century ago to be the genius of the firm is on the edge of being proved an
anachronistic chimera under the modem circumstances of financial corporatism.
Classical assumptions are called into question. The emerging owners of publicly
held firms are now on equal terms with the incumbent management as regards
size, power, and sophistication.' 6 If properly channeled, this unique set of qualby local authorities and the Federal State. The still prevailing business objective is to act as a house
bank to the federal government, although a number of ventures were undertaken in the past to
broaden the scope of activities. The most spectacular move was the recent conclusion of a cooperation agreement with London-based Standard Chartered Bank for the purpose of pooling the merchant bank activities. See 34 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] R 392 (1989).
11. See 35 AG R 74 (1990).
12. 36 AG R 242 (1991).
13. See Uwe H. Schneider, Aufdem Weg in den Pensionskassen-korporatismus,35 AG 317,
320 (1990).
14. See Ruder, The Impact of InstitutionalInvestors on Large Corporations,SEC News Release,
Oct. 11, 1987, at 2.
15. A. A. Berle & G. C. Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 1932 (rev.
ed. 1967).
16. Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Ownership and the Restructuring of Corporations, in
FESTSCHRIFr FOR ERNST STEINDORFF ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 13. MA.Z 1990, at 7, 23 (Jurgen F.
Baur, Klaus J. Hopt, Peter Mailinder eds., 1990).
VOL. 26, NO. 2
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ifications provides a lever to make management more respondent to the needs of
shareholders and other corporate constituencies, such as, employees, customers,
suppliers, and local communities. 17
The emerging power, and already demonstrated ability of institutional investors to exercise it, inevitably triggers dissonances in the fine-tuned triad of
ownership, finance, and control. Part I of this article serves to exemplify the
discord by reviewing the highlights of the 1990 proxy season, which could be the
alarm signals of what may become an electoral upheaval-early stirrings that
could lead to the creation of the republic of corporate America. Part II attempts
to explain why fund managers cannot evade the corporate governance debate like
individual shareholders by simply "taking a dollar today, in lieu of waiting for
tomorrow." 18 Part III appraises a number of proposals that have been advanced
to restore shareholder rights and the accountability of corporate managers to
shareholders. Part IV analyzes the possible implications and challenges of the
paradigmatic change in corporate governance originated in the United States for
corporate Germany. A summary and concluding remarks are presented in part V.
I. Canvassing Institutional Investors
The basic dynamics of the 1990 proxy solicitations that bombarded shareholders with persuasive pleas until the very day of a company's annual general
meeting had a great deal in common. Usually, the financial returns and the
growth of the company under attack fell short of the average indices for the
Fortune 500 corporations or, as a more specific benchmark, for the industry in
question. Therefore, incumbent management was blamed for having failed to
create value for the owners. Further, and the focal point of criticism, was the
creeping disenfranchisement of the shareholders by means of barriers to potential
corporate control transactions such as the introduction of shareholder rights plans
(poison pills), staggered board terms, and fair price provisions.
The isolated and, a fortiori, the combined effect of those defensive efforts has
had an adverse impact on institutional investments, particularly since in the late
1980s courts have shown a greater degree of receptivity to strategies aimed at the
preservation of corporate independence rather than mediatization. 19 And this is
only one facet of the apocalyptic writing on the wall. State legislators have
increasingly enacted antitakeover laws, 20 banks as the indispensable financial
17. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1987).
18. Statement ascribed to T. Boone Pickens, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Mesa Petroleum.
Louis Lowenstein & Ira M. Millstein, The American Corporationand the InstitutionalInvestor: Are
There Lessons from Abroad?: Introduction, COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 739, 745 (1988). See also Warren A. Law, A CorporationIs More Than Its Stock, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1986, at 80, 83.
19. See Leo Herzel & Richard W. Shepro, DelawareSupreme CourtBoosts Powers of Takeover
Target Boards, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1990, at 16.
20. Contemptfor Shareholders, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 1990, at 16. An overview of the most
recent legislative history is provided in Stephen Mahle, Proxy Contests, Agency Costs, and Third
SUMMER 1992
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intermediaries have shown less enthusiasm for putting up their own monies on
21
the line in takeover situations, and the junk bond market has fallen into a coma.
In the face of such a bleak outlook, the following scenario emerges: The
largest shareholder takes the initiative and urges corporate management to adopt
a far-reaching restructuring program. However, his venture is an empty threat if
he does not find allies among the other shareholders. Addressing the limited
number of institutional investors with their extraordinarily great voting power is
evidently the most efficient way of forming an allied reform bloc. As this is an
open secret for the incumbent management, it also begins courting institutional
investors. Which competitor will finally succeed hinges on the bargain each has
to offer. However, it appears as if incumbent management enjoys a competitive
advantage in drawing on its possession of the current list of shareholders,22 its
full access to corporate assets to finance its solicitation, 23 and its bonus of power.
Just like every human being, fund managers cannot exempt themselves from the
psychological bias of staying with people to whom they have accommodated
over the years. They are afraid of the uncertainties of new characters who may
disturb the routine: Semper ita fecerunt!
A.

HAROLD SIMMONS' CRUSADE FOR SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY

1. Setup
Houston-based NL Industries Inc. (NL) bought under Dallas investor
Harold C. Simmons' aegis an 18.95 percent stake in Lockheed Corp., which
equaled an investment of $550 million. From the first acquisition of Lockheed
shares by NL on August 29, 1988, to February 14, 1990, Lockheed's stock price
dropped by nearly 40 percent from $54-/4 to $37- 3/8-a decline in aggregate
market value of over $1.3 billion that wiped out $100 million of Simmons' initial
cumulative investment.
Based on the obvious perception that Lockheed management was failing to
deliver adequate return on its shareholders' investment, Simmons met with
Daniel M. Tellep, Lockheed's chairman of the board and chief executive officer,
and requested that NL be given up to six of the fifteen seats on Lockheed's board
of directors. Although Tellep and his fellow directors owned in aggregate less

Generation Antitakeover Statutes, 15 J. CORP. L. 721, 750-55 (1990). The nation's newest and
toughest antitakeover statute was passed by the Pennsylvania legislature on April 23-24, 1990. For
a more complete discussion, see infra notes 32-33 & accompanying text.
21. See Louis Lowenstein, Market Sees That Junk Bonds Are What They Are, Well, Junk, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 13, 1990, at 18.
22. Under the so-called "disclose or mail" principle laid down in SEC-Rule 14a-7, management
may elect to mail an insurgent's proxy materials to stockholders rather than supplying the insurgent
with the current shareholder list. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1991).
23. Cf. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 536
(1990); James E. Heard, InstitutionalInvestors and CorporateGovernance:The U.S. Perspective, in
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 245, 252 (J.C.F. Lufkin & D. Gallagher eds., 1990).
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than 1 percent of the common stock, they declined Simmons' request for board
representation. On February 21, 1990, NL amended its Schedule 13D filing to
disclose its determination to commence soliciting proxies in support of the election of fourteen nominees of NL to Lockheed's board of directors. Less than two
weeks later, the company announced it had moved up the annual meeting from
mid-May to March 29, 1990.
Simmons recognized from the outset that his most important audience were
the institutional investors, of whom a relatively small group of 120 owned over
25 percent of Lockheed's outstanding stock. The collective holdings of all institutions amounted to 60 percent. Simmons courted them vigorously by traveling around the country and discussing issues related to shareholder democracy
such as confidential voting, removal of Lockheed's poison pill, placing restrictions on greenmail, and opting out of the Delaware antitakeover law. He also
assembled a slate of board nominees with close ties both to the aeronautics
industry and the military, reflecting Lockheed's position as the sixth largest
defense contractor within the United States. The most prominent candidates were
former Republican Senator John Tower of Texas, who had chaired the Armed
Services Committee from 1981-85 and President Ronald Reagan's Special Review Board on the Iran-Contra affair, and Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., the
former Chief of Naval Operations. Provided the members of his slate were
elected, Simmons promised that he would commission an in-depth analysis of
Lockheed's business policy and attempt to transform Lockheed into a high-tech
manufacturer with competencies in the nonmilitary product market. Hence, his
takeover strategy was to gain control over Lockheed through a proxy fight
without making a concurrent cash tender offer.
In supporting confidential voting Simmons picked up a proposal advanced by
Harrison J. Goldwin, then Comptroller of the City of New York and, as such,
trustee of the New York City Employees' Retirement System, to require all
proxies, ballots, and voting tabulations that identify shareholders to be kept
secret. The suggestion was congenial because its objective was to avoid real or
perceived coercion of individual shareholders (for example, subscribers to an
Employee Stock Ownership Plan) and institutional money managers by business
management. Both groups have to fear retaliation in case of nonobservance of
management's recommendations by losing either their jobs or lucrative business
opportunities.
Standing up for opting out of section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation
law 24 happened to coincide with a criticism of another major institutional shareholder. The California Public Employee's Retirement System, a $56 billion
public pension fund with a 500,000-share interest in Lockheed, had repeatedly
asserted that Lockheed's reincorporation in Delaware (from California) in 1986
was for the mere purpose of taking the company "out of play." Opting out would
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1990).
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partially reverse this allegedly selfish managerial decision by allowing takeovers
with the reasonable expectation for the shareholders of cashing in a corporate
control premium. After all, the power to decide whether to accept or reject an
acquisition proposal would be removed from the board level and shifted to the
general, or in case of emergency, to a special shareholders' meeting.
2. Outcome
The canvassing of the institutional investors whose goals dovetailed with
Simmons' proved to be a sweeping success, including to everybody's surprise
the detoxification of the poison pill. Although all the incumbent board members
were reelected by a margin of 62 percent to 38 percent, 25 Lockheed had agreed
up front to enlarge the board by three seats specifically reserved for representatives of the institutional investors' clientele. 26 The demand both for the prohibition of greenmailing and for the introduction of confidential voting put Lockheed's management under duress. After stalling tactics in the run-up phase,
management rapidly gave in as the annual meeting approached and the likelihood
of a close election appeared. In another last-minute effort to lure large shareholders who were leaning toward support of Simmons, Lockheed announced that
it would subordinate to the shareholders' will and opt out of section 203 of the
Delaware General Corporation law on the condition that a significant minority of
shareholders voted in favor of such action.
As would be expected, on the day of the annual meeting the New York Times
trumpeted in bold letters: "Lockheed Gives in to Big Holders-Concession
Made to Thwart Simmons." 27 Simmons himself was quoted with the euphoric
statement: "We've achieved a lot here. We focussed
them on profits, and we
28
gave them an education in shareholders' rights."
3. Critical Evaluation
Without doubt, Simmons' proxy fight generated a major shake-up within the
entrenched Lockheed organization. For a neutral observer, however, the conclusion is nearly irrefutable that the institutional investors came off best from this
continually headline-hitting corporate brawl. Simmons won a Pyrrhic victory,
being left with a paper loss of $100 million on his one fifth stake in Lockheed and
an additional $6 million in out-of-pocket expenses for his proxy fight campaign
without having achieved his cardinal goal of direct board representation. On the

25. See Michael Lev, Lockheed Claims Victory over Simmons, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1990, at
D1, D4; Rick Wartzman & Karen Blumenthal, Lockheed Wins Proxy Battle with Simmons, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 11, 1990, at A3.
26. See Karen Blumenthal & Rick Wartzman, Lockheed Corp. Refuses to Give Simmons 3 Seats,
WALL ST. J.,Mar. 28, 1990, at A3; Richard W. Stevenson, InstitutionalInvestors to Get a Seat on
Lockheed's Board, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1990, at DI, D8.
27. Richard W. Stevenson, Lockheed Gives in to Big Holders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1990, at D1.
28. Id. at D4.
VOL. 26, NO. 2

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS

335

other hand, the incumbent management was stigmatized as a group of appeasers.
In the beginning they took up a bold stance, but their verbal shows of strength
were not followed by any energetic opposition when the real battle took place in
the assembly hall of the general shareholders' meeting. Management preferred to
shy away from an open confrontation with Simmons that could have jeopardized
their job security.
B.

THE BELZBERG BROTHERS' SIEGE OF
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC.

1. Setup
The target company of this takeover battle was Armstrong World Industries,
Inc. (Armstrong), a fully vertically integrated flooring and building products
company based in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Since 1989, Armstrong's management had carried out a business plan aiming at organizational restructuring and
salaried work force reduction. "Back to core business" and slashing overhead
costs was incumbent maiagement's hasty reaction after it had learned of a rapid
accumulation of a large block of shares in the sphere of influence of the Belzberg
brothers, then one of Canada's wealthiest family clans, based in Vancouver,
British Columbia. Their deliberate successive buying of Armstrong's stock was
mainly engineered through three corporate affiliates. As of April 2, 1990, they
owned an aggregate of 4,780,400 common shares, constituting approximately
11.51 percent of the outstanding common shares -and 10.14 percent of the outstanding securities entitled to vote at the annual meeting.
In the meantime, in April 1989, the Belzbergs had examined in vain the
possibility of a business combination with Armstrong on a negotiated basis. In
response, Armstrong's board of directors turned the tables and instituted an
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). On June 26, 1989, Armstrong inquired
with the Belzberg affiliates whether they were willing to sell their stakes in light
of this development. The Belzbergs declined outright. As of April 2, 1990, the
Mellon Bank, the trustee of the ESOP, held beneficial ownership of 5,623,358
shares of a new series of convertible preferred stock equivalent to 11.74 percent
of the outstanding common stock.
On February 1, 1990, one of the affiliates of the Belzberg concern retained the
investment banking firm Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp. to act as
its exclusive financial advisor with respect to its involvement in Armstrong. On
March 2, 1990, the Belzbergs announced publicly that, "in view of developments at and pertinent to Armstrong, and financial markets, as well as general
economic conditions," they had asked their investment banker to approach third
parties to discuss the possibility of acquiring all or part of Armstrong's business,
either alone or in conjunction with them. 29 This abrupt shift from a determined
29. Peter Cooney, Belzbergs Seek to Enlist Third Parties in Pursuit of Armstrong, REuTER Bus.
REP., Mar. 5, 1990.
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go-strategy to a half-hearted partial go- or even no-go-strategy was hardly persuasive because cloudy factors were already looming before the March 2nd
announcement.
First, Armstrong's stock price had not shown any significant appreciation
since April 27, 1987, when the reign of the four directors presently standing for
reelection began. The price then was $33.5; on February 2, 1990, it amounted to
$35, and by March 30, 1990, the closing price of a common share was $33.125.
Taking further into consideration the aggregate dividends of $2.96 per share paid
during the almost three-year period, the investors in Armstrong shares were left
with an annual yield of approximately 3 percent, well below the inflation rate
during the period.
Second, under the heading of developments related to Armstrong's product
markets, came the sharp downturn in the housing and construction industry.
Consequently, the demand for Armstrong's durable goods was slack.
Third, the extinction of the junk bond market was already a fait accompli
following the collapse on October 7, 1989, of the management-led takeover bid
for UAC Corp. This collapse severely pinched not only the Belzbergs' but also
other corporate raiders' financing options. Likewise, the nebulous reference to
the "general economic conditions" was an empty shell.
As a result, the Belzbergs were left with a $31 million paper loss in an
unsuccessful hostile takeover attempt. 30 However, instead of giving up and liquidating their stock position, 3' the Belzbergs decided to pursue their original goal
of obtaining corporate control over Armstrong by waging a proxy fight at the
annual meeting scheduled for April 30, 1990.
To rectify the dismal state of affairs, the affiliates pertinent to the far-flung
financial concern of the Belzberg family formed the Shareholder Committee for
Responsible Corporate Governance of Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (the
Committee). Its agenda was twofold. First it asked shareholders to support the
election of a slate of four board nominees to fill the vacancies of Armstrong's
staggered board that were to expire at the 1990 annual meeting. Second, the
Committee proposed five amendments to Armstrong's articles of incorporation
that were designed to make it harder for Armstrong's board to ignore the shareholders' readiness for a sale or a merger. The general thrust was to opt out of
32
several provisions in the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law (the PBCL)
that were endorsed by Armstrong's top management and sponsored by State Senator Noah Wenger, whose constituency was in Lancaster, the site of Armstrong's
30. See Vindu P. Goel & Gary Lamphier, Samuel Belzberg Plays Down Reputation as a Raider
in Armstrong Proxy Fight, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1990, at 7C.
31. This is what most of the securities analysts expected to happen. See Cooney, supra note 29
(quotations cited therein).
32. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2541 et seq. (1991) (originally passed in the General Assembly
of Pennsylvania as Session Bill No. 1310 amended on third consideration, 1989 Sess. (Dec. 12,
1989, printer's no. 1824)).
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headquarters. The PBCL came into effect on April 27, 1990, when Pennsylvania
Governor Robert B. Casey signed it so as to protect Armstrong from the
33
Belzbergs' proxy fight scheduled for the annual meeting on April 30, 1990.
The Committee placed emphasis on the 1990 annual meeting as the only
chance for the shareholders to act in their self-interest to restore the rights of
which the new legislation had deprived them. 34 Afterwards, the Committee
explained, the right of initiative would shift to the board of directors. That body
would decide in its own discretion which amendments to propose to the shareholders. Accordingly, the Committee submitted the following five proposals to
shareholder voting: (1) the right to call a special shareholder's meeting; (2) the
right to propose amendments to the articles of incorporation; (3) opting out of the
five-year prohibition of business combinations under subchapter F of chapter 25
of the PBCL; (4) immediate effect of the derogation of subchapter F; and (5) permission of majority decisions by written consent.
2. Outcome
According to the final tally of the 155 million proxy votes cast, board nominees received about 105 million votes and Belzberg nominees about 50 million.
Under the complicated cumulative voting system, which allotted each shareholder four votes per share and the right to divide those votes among the eight
candidates in any way he or she chose, including leaving them to proxy solicitor's discretion, incumbent management decided to cumulate its proxy votes to
reelect three directors. The Belzbergs cumulated their votes to elect Harvard
Business School professor Michael C. Jensen. 35 The binding shareholder vote on
the five proposed amendments to Armstrong's corporate charter was deleted
36
from the agenda because a federal trial on their validity was still pending.
Although the Belzbergs averred on the day of their electoral defeat that they
would not lift the pressure from Armstrong's incumbent management to con37
stantly explore the possibility of a business combination with another company,
33. Anti-Takeover Law Takes Effect, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 28, 1990, at sec. 2, 1-2; Anti-Takeover
Law Signed, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1990, at 34. For an elaborated analysis of the constitutional
objections to and the economic implications of the so-called "Armstrong Law" see Thomas C.
Paefgen, Alle Macht dem Management. Das Paradoxon der US-amerikanischen Anti-TakeoverGesetzgebung am Beispiel von Pennsylvania, 36 AG 41, 49 et seq., 54 et seq. (1991).
34. The freedom of choice to opt out of all or part of the provisions of the Pennsylvania Business
Corporation Law (PBCL) was limited to a window of ninety days after coming into force. More than
sixty-five companies, equivalent to about 21% of Pennsylvania's publicly traded corporations, including Westinghouse Electric Corp. and H. J. Heinz Co. have made timely use of the exemption.
Cf. Black, supra note 23, at 574; Vindu P. Goel, Many Top Pennsylvania Firms Opt Out of Provisions and State Anti-Takeover Law, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1990, at A5.
35. Management Wins 3 of 4 Contested Seats on Board, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1990, at C14.
36. Vindu P. Goel, Armstrong Wins 3 of 4 Contested Seats for Company's Board, WALL ST. J.,
May 15, 1990, at A4.
37. In the same vein, Samuel Belzberg's later statement that he regarded the stake in Armstrong
as a "long-term" investment. See Gary Lamphier, Belzberg Says First City Might Drop Risk
Arbitrage, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1990, at Cl.
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it took them less than four weeks to break their word. On May 30, 1990, the
affiliated companies sold all their shares at an estimated $18 million loss, which
was partially made whole by a settlement fee of $4.4 million. Under the agreement the Belzbergs dropped all litigation against Armstrong, including a challenge to the constitutionality of the PBCL and a lawsuit seeking a binding vote
on the five corporate governance amendments. A nonaggression pact was also
38
accorded for a period of ten years.
3. Critical Evaluation
At first sight one is tempted to say that the Belzbergs blooded their collective
nose in their raid on Armstrong. A cash outlay of $13.6 million and the additional losses on the invested capital certainly were a dear price for one board
mandate in return. Moreover, not only was Armstrong as the specific target
company "put out of play" for a decade; the whole market for corporate control
in the state of Pennsylvania practically dried up after the enactment of the
management-friendly PBCL-which has already gone into the legislative annals
as the "Armstrong" bill.39
However, one must not overlook the peculiarities of this specific takeover
battle. First, the cumulative voting system and the staggered board terms made
it easier for incumbent management to wear the Belzbergs down. Second, the
Belzbergs fell easy prey to propaganda to damage their self-depicted image as
protagonists of shareholder democracy. 4° It only sufficed to recall their aggressive bid for Ashland Oil Company (Ashland) in 1986. Furthermore, their credibility was undermined by a criminal conviction of a member of the Belzberg
family because of a violation of section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
193441 in connection with illegal "parking" of stock with an investment bank
during the Ashland raid.4 2 The personalization of the proxy contest was an
ingenious move to drive a wedge between the Belzberg brothers and the other
shareholders. The legitimate business concerns were cleverly pushed into the
background. It was simple for Armstrong's management to brand the Belzbergs
as a pack of greedy wolves in sheep's clothing.
C.

BTR's PROXY CONTEST FOR NORTON
wrrH SAiNr-GoBAIN's DEEP POCKETS

THWARTED

1. Setup
ER Holdings, Inc. (ER) an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of the British
conglomerate BTR P.L.C. (BTR) launched a $75 all-cash/all-shares ($1.64 bil38. See Armstrong Sets Pact with Belzberg Firms to Resolve Disputes, WALL ST. J., June 7,
1990, at B4.
39. Leslie Wayne, Anti-Takeover ProposalGains in Pennsylvania, N.Y. ThMEs, Apr. 4, 1990, at B2.

40. A "fighting ad" was placed by Armstrong's management in WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1990, at C23.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1990).
42. Securities and Exchange Commission v. First City Financial Corporation Ltd., 688 F.2d 705
(D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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lion in aggregate) hostile tender offer for Norton Co. (Norton) on March 16,
1990. ER, a Delaware corporation, beneficially owned 325,000 shares (1.7
percent) of Norton common stock as of March 30, 1990. Norton, a manufacturer
of abrasives, superabrasives, ceramics, and other engineering materials, was
incorporated in Massachusetts.
The $75 per share offer was generally viewed favorably, considering its market
price was $58-1/4 per share before the offer and the Norton share price had never
exceeded $64 since the company's foundation in 1885. Wall Street analysts
raised serious doubts as to whether a white knight would come forward, given
the depressed state of Norton's markets and the relative generous level of BTR's
offer at nineteen times historic earnings. 43 As one analyst observed, "[tihe BTR
offer looks like a fair one. To top that price you'd have to have pretty fancy
plans."44
Nevertheless, Norton's board turned BTR's "inadequate" offer down. Relying on its financial advisor, management came to the conclusion that remaining
an independent entity would be a superior alternative to BTR's proposal. 45
Accordingly, Norton established a vigorous defense system. Opposition to the
offer was encouraged among employees and local residents, who then for their
part lobbied for legislation to thwart the offer. Governor Michael S. Dukakis
hastened to sign into law an antitakeover bill that prohibited companies incorporated in Massachusetts from electing more than one-third of their board members each year. The boards were allowed to opt out of the staggered election
requirement at any time, but shareholders were not allowed to undo the provision
until January 1, 1992, and then only by a two-thirds vote. Thus, BTR could win
only three seats of the board out of a total of eleven seats at the annual meeting
on April 26, 1990.46
2. Outcome
Although more than half of Norton's common shares had been tendered,
which would have enabled BTR's slate of three directors to take up their seats in
the boardroom, Norton abruptly forestalled BTR's progress by concluding a
negotiated merger with Compagnie de Saint-Gobain S.A. (Saint-Gobain), a
French conglomerate, for $90 a share or about $1.9 billion in cash. Saint-Gobain
agreed that Norton's principal business would continue to operate in Worcester.
The conclusion of long-term employment contracts with a number of Norton key
executives ensured continuity of management. 47

43. Martin Dickson, Changing the Rules of the Ball Game, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1990, at 25.
44. William M. Bulkeley et al., Norton Co. Could Face a Proxy Battle if It Doesn'tAccept BTR
Takeover Bid, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1990, at A3.
45. Norton Rejects Offer by BTR as "Inadequate," WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1990, at Al.
46. Richard D. Hylton, Talking Deals: No End in Sight in Norton Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
1990, at D2; New State Law Aids Norton in Bid to Block Takeover, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 1990, at 3C.
47. Richard D. Hylton, $1.9 Billion Bid Taken by Norton, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1990, at D1;
David Stipp, Norton Agrees to Be Acquired by Saint Gobain, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1990, at A3.
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Immediately after learning of this surprise bid, BTR reversed itself, sold its
325,000 Norton shares for a $13 million profit, withdrew its board nominees,
and told Norton's stockholders who had already tendered their shares they could
pull them back. 48 John C. Cahill, BTR's chief executive officer, had always
declared that he regarded the Norton offer as fair and final and was only willing
to consider increasing it if confidential information initially withheld by Norton
showed that a higher price was warranted. 49 He was loathe to be involved in an
overreaching price battle.
3. Critical Evaluation
Norton's board strategy shows a striking similarity with Armstrong's mode of
operating. Both successfully lobbied state legislators for support. The comfortable coalition between politicians and local corporate citizens not only put the
out-of-state intruders to flight, it also erected new legal obstacles on the free
market for corporate control. After the strengthening of the state antitakeover
law, the onus to lobby the institutional investors shifted to the bidding companies. In the Belzberg case, low public opinion created an unbridgeable credibility
gap, whereas BTR failed because of its self-discipline in not going beyond its
standards of financial reasonableness. In both situations institutional investors
were not confronted with a dilemma because each bid lacked a key success factor
in financial markets: credibility or superlative terms. American xenophobia was
at best, if at all, a marginal issue, as can be easily exemplified by Norton's white
50
knight, Saint-Gobain.
D.

AMERICAN GENERAL WINS THE PROXY BATTLE AGAINST
TORCHMARK BUT LOSES THE INDEPENDENCE WAR

1. Setup
On March 26, 1990, Torchmark Corp. (Torchmark), an insurance and financial services company, made an unsolicited offer of $50 per share, or about $6.3
billion in cash and stock, for American General Corp. (American General). One
week later Torchmark withdrew the bid, saying American General had not responded to its offer in time.
Simultaneously, however, Torchmark proposed its own slate of five independent
nominees for American General's board, indicating that it would halt any further
acquisition attempts in the event of defeat at the latter's annual meeting on May 2,
1990. Moreover, it introduced a nonbinding resolution seeking to force American
General's board to put the company on the auction block. 51 Having established
48. BTR Has Sold Its 1.7% Stake in Norton Co., WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1990, at B9A.
49. See Lawrence Ingrassia, BTR PLC Begins Proxy Fight in Bid for Norton Co., WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 13, 1990, at A2.
50. See David Duffy, Norton Backlash "Not Xenophobic," FIN. TIMES, May 2, 1990, at 23.
51. See Rick Christie, Torchmark Bid to Be Dropped if Slate Fails, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1990,
at A3.
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its position, Torchmark conducted an intensive election campaign focusing on
American General's institutional investors, who controlled about 69 percent of the
latter's common shares. Interestingly enough, about 30 percent of the stock was
owned by institutions that also owned 8 percent of Torchmark shares.
2. Outcome
On May 2, 1990, Torchmark emerged victorious. Although General American
won the proxy vote by a margin of 60 percent to 40 percent, Harold S. Hook, the
chairman of the board and chief executive officer, stunned the shareholders by
saying that American General was up for sale. Once the company had been "put
into play," he felt compelled to take the appropriate steps, particularly in light of
the increased vulnerability of the company due to reduced earnings per share
during the last three years and the accordingly depressed stock price. By initiating the action, American General's chieftain hoped to have a better 5control
over
2
the auction process and to extract the maximum shareholder profit.
3. Critical Evaluation
General American's unconditional surrender was prompted by mounting pressures within the life insurance industry for consolidation and cost cutting. Incumbent management came to the inevitable conclusion that it could not achieve
the turnaround without external help. The chronic lag behind the industry average made the shareholders increasingly impatient and more susceptible to a
corporate control transaction, be it in whole or piecemeal. Fending off Torchmark would only have allowed some breathing time before the next contender
would have caused trouble anew.5 3 Hence, management would have been nearly
constantly distracted from its genuine task of running the company. Therefore, it
chose pragmatically to get the unpleasant matter over and done with.
Institutional investors were actively relieved of a looming clash of interests
that probably sooner or later would have cost incumbent management its position
in any event. Judged from this perspective, the 1990 proxy contest only accelerated a development that had its roots in the company's dissatisfying past
performance. Management knew that its resistance against Torchmark was useless after roughly 50 percent of the shareholder votes were cast in favor of the
nonbinding referendum that American General be put up for sale. 54

52. Cf. Thomas C. Hayes, American General Up for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1990, at DI
("We wanted to be in control of the process and not be pecked to death by ducks.").
53. See Randall Smith & Michael Allen, American General Proxy-Vote Victory Wouldn't End
Pressureto Lift Stock Price, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1990, at A3.
54. The outcome of the election was kept secret by the defeated management. Randall Smith,
Storming Barricades with a Proxy, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1990, at Cl, C17. Their subsequent
process of deduction was in line with recent empirical evidence suggesting that management may win
the battle in proxy contest, but insurgent shareholders win the war. A 1989 study of sixty major proxy
contests revealed that while management prevailed in proxy contests 70 percent of the time, in most
cases a new management team was in place within three years of the contest.
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CARL C. ICAHN VERSUS USX CORP.:
BREAKING

Up Is

HARD TO

Do

1. Setup
In the summer of 1986 Carl C. Icahn started to buy stock of USX Corp.
(USX). He stopped his purchases at a 13.3 percent stake, making him the largest
individual shareholder, in order not to trigger a poison pill provision that prevented anyone from acquiring more than 15 percent of USX stock without its
becoming prohibitively expensive.
Rather, in spring 1990 he submitted a spin-off proposal to the shareholders
aiming at a de-diversification of USX. The separation into two distinct
stockholder-owned companies, that of Marathon Oil Company and all other
energy-related USX business units on the one hand and former U.S. Steel Corp.
on the other hand, would in Icahn's view have yielded an aggregate value of $48
a share instead of the current stock market price oscillating in the low $30s.
According to Icahn's calculations, with its appreciation of 8.4 percent in the last
fifteen years, USX had failed to keep pace with the market price increases
recorded by either pure oil or steel companies, let alone with the 308 percent
increase in the S & P 500 stock index during the same period.
According to the terms of the proposal, USX would have distributed as a
dividend to all shareholders a common stock interest of not less than 80 percent
of the equity of U.S. Steel, which would have consisted of all assets and liabilities (not to include more than $1.5 billion of long-term debt) associated with
USX's steel business. Stockholders would have retained their common stock
interest in USX, which would have then primarily consisted of Marathon Oil
Company and the minority interest, if any, in U.S. Steel Corp. The implementation of the spin-off plan was alleged to be tax-free both to USX and its
shareholders and would retain USX's existing tax-loss carryforwards.
Icahn based his proposals on three arguments:
* If and when unrelated businesses are separated, investors and financial
analysts are able to price each of the separate entities more accurately by
taking into consideration their independent prospects and strategic orientations.
* The management of each separate business unit can be held more accountable for its performance as each business stands on its own without the
benefit of cross-subsidization.
" The creation of distinct publicly traded companies provides a wider choice of
55
investment opportunities, thus leading to more efficient capital formation.

55. For a critical assessment of those popular explanations for the empirically established positive stock market reaction to spin-offs see Katherine Schipper & Abbey Smith, The Corporate
Spin-Off Phenomenon, MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J., Summer 1984, at 27-34. See generally Lindley H.

Clark, De-Diversification Aid to Productivity, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1990, at Al.
VOL. 26, NO. 2

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS

343

On April 25, 1990, Icahn went a step further by announcing plans to acquire
additional $800 million of USX stock, provided, however, that his spin-off
proposal met with shareholders' majority approval at the firm's forthcoming
annual meeting and the poison pill provision was abolished.
2. Outcome
On the day after USX's general shareholders' meeting on May 8, 1990, Mr.
Icahn conceded that his highly visible campaign with a $10 million budget for
mass media advertising had come to nothing. Although some institutional investors were sympathetic to Icahn's plan, they chose to support the incumbent
management, which had signaled that it too would consider the merits of Icahn's
plan at some future date when the steel market was in less turmoil. Apparently,
institutional investors shrank away from the risk of further change after USX's
management had initiated a massive, painful restructuring, which had begun to
pay off with improving financial results. Hence, Icahn faced an uphill battle
against a winning board team. He failed to persuade the institutional investors
that his superior managerial skills could generate even higher value for USX's
pool of assets. 56
3. Critical Evaluation
Icahn's proxy contest is to be distinguished from the Torchmark versus American General proxy battle insofar as it was not intended also to resolve a power
struggle. Rather, it only asked for the adoption of a nonbinding shareholder
resolution on a fundamental corporate decision. More precisely it revolved
around a substantive disagreement over corporate strategy, whether or not USX
would function more effectively if it spun-off its steel-making unit from its oil
and gas operations. Although in all likelihood Icahn had made his initial USX
investment with a takeover in mind, the complex debate over corporate strategy
in the proxy arena never escalated into a shadow takeover attempt as could be
observed with the Belzbergs. Furthermore, the USX election had just as little in
common with the Lockheed case, since no shareholder rights were at stake that
called for a resolute defense action against further erosion.
In the light of these particular circumstances institutional investors did not
regard it as opportune to flex their muscles because Icahn's constant presence
provided them with greater leverage for putting pressure on management to
improve USX's share price than could a single warning shot that incumbent
management might possibly ignore. In fact, USX's board of directors resorted to

56. Jonathan P. Hicks, Icahn Seen Failing in USX Vote, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1990, at Cl. It
should be noted that USX's management let pass a waiting period of less than one year before it
recognized Icahn's business acumen as being sound and convincing enough to carry out the restructuring he had sought in 1990. See Jonathan P. Hicks, USX to Issue Stock Linked to Steel Unit, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1991, at C1.
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Lockheed's successful strategy of compromising. 57 They adopted the idea of a
corporate spin-off so that Icahn's competitive advantage was neutralized. In
addition, the tactic of denigration that occurred in the Belzberg case came into
play. The subtle allusions to Icahn's past as a corporate raider shrilled the alarm
bells within the financial community. Icahn's profession that he had seen the light
in the meantime was widely interpreted as an opportunistic dissimulation.
II. The Inapplicability of the "Wall Street Rule"
to Institutional Investors
With rare unanimity, the statements of the 1990 proxy season articulated the
categorical appeal for increased shareholder participation in corporate governance as opposed to deference to corporate decision-making. From the institutional investors' (pension funds not subject to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA),5 s banks, insurance companies, mutual funds) perspective
the question arises whether there is any compelling reason why they should
interfere with managerial actions criticized for being contrary to shareholder
interest. In contrast to Albert 0. Hirschman's 59 more complex exit-voiceanalysis, Daniel R. Fischel 6° has accentuated that the availability of the exit
option stands in a reciprocal relationship to the importance of voice and voting.
Since interference entails the expenditure of time, effort, and money to make an
informed opinion about the legitimacy and validity of the competing proposals,
the more rational plan for the canvassed institutional investors would be to sell
their stock instead of dedicating more resources to voting. The liquid market in
publicly traded shares is claimed to be a superior alternative over participation in
corporate governance. Management's departure from the shareholder interest
will be punished by the market for capital and corporate control as well as for
managerial services. Each market, after all, is a mirror of the available information about its participants and goods. Yet unresolved is the crucial question

57. See Richard W. Stevenson, Talking Deals: Lockheed's Moves in Proxy Fight, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1990, at D2.
58. Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1168
(1990)). As to the widely unknown responsibilities under ERISA (§§ 401-14), see the enlightening
comments of J. E. Heard & J. C. F. Lufkin, ERISA andProxy Voting, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
GOvERNANCE, supra note 23, at 5 et seq. See also Eugene Maloney, Proxy Voting Responsibility
under ERISA, 7 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 259-63 (1988).
59. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, OR-

46 (1970).
60. Daniel R. Fischel, The CorporateGovernance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1277-78

GANIZATIONS, AND STATES

(1982). The potential costs and the set of possible regulatory measures at hand to strike a balance
between the "voice" and the "exit option" are discussed in John C. Coffee, Liquidity Versus
Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 1328 et seq.,

1336 et seq. (1991).
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whether or not the so-called "Wall Street Rule"61 applies with the same rigidity
both to private and institutional investors. At least one economic and one legal
argument suggest that the answer is in the negative.

A.

Too

BIG TO VOTE WITH THE FEET

As already touched on at the beginning, one of the salient features in the
evolution of the U.S. capital markets over the last six decades has been the
dramatic shift of ownership of securities from individual to institutional investors. Starting in 1950 with assets worth $107 billion and ownership of 8 percent
of outstanding corporate equity, in the period from 1981 to 1987 the value of total
assets managed by institutional investors more than doubled from $2.1 trillion to
$4.46 trillion. In 1986, not less than 42.7 percent of the total stock outstanding
was in the hands of institutional investors. Today institutions control assets worth
$6 trillion-more than the GNP of the United States-and account for nearly 20
percent of all financial assets and 45 percent of all outstanding equities.
Among them pension funds take the major share of approximately 21 percent
of all outstanding U.S. equities. This number translates into holdings of insti62
tutional total assets in 1981 of 42.5 percent and in 1987 of 43.5 percent.
Hence, pension funds could strengthen their leading position and are likely to
continue growing.63
A brief glance at publicly listed common stocks elucidates the unbroken trend
towards concentration of ownership in corporate America. When the Securities
Act of 1933 came into force, institutions owned about 8 percent of the outstanding NYSE quoted securities. When in the 1950s, the driving out of private and
nonprofessional investors gained momentum so that by 1987, 45 percent of the
almost $3 trillion of public company stocks were held in institutional portfolios.
The concentration ratio is even higher in the upper segment represented by the
companies included in the prestigious S&P Stock Index which, above all, warrants for a higher degree of fungibility and liquidity. In 1987, forty-seven out of

61. The glossary in Louis LoWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET SHORT ThRM GAIN
AND THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 256-57 (1988) sums up its substance as follows:
If one shareholder turns activist, investing time and talent in overseeing an otherwise indolent management, the
benefits accrue in full measure to all the other shareholders, even if they sit on their hands. Hence the rule that
investors should not bother to become thoughtful, active shareholders. If they lose confidence in management, the
only sensible course is to sell out. What is good advice for any one investor, however, is bad for them collectively,
since they cannot all sell out. Even those who do will often have sold at an unnecessarily depressed price. While
almost everyone recognizes the dilemma, no one seems much inclined to consider changes.

62. Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Emerging Role of the InstitutionalInvestor, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 12, 1990, at 5; BUXBAUM, supra note 16, at 16-17; BRANCATO & GAUGHAN, supra note 1, at
6; Jay 0. Light, Privatization of Equity, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 62, 63; William
Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Big Difference, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 70, 71.
63. According to an estimation by the Federal Reserve Board this share will climb to 50 percent
by the year 2000. See Bruce Nussbaum & Judith H. Dobrzynski, The Battlefor Corporate Control,
Bus. WEEK, May 18, 1987, at 102, 103-104.
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the fifty largest corporations had institutional ownership that exceeded 33 percent
of their total outstanding stock. Forty-one of these fifty corporations had institutional holdings in excess of 40 percent of their total outstanding stock, and
twenty-seven of them had institutional holdings in excess of 50 percent of their
outstanding stock. 64
A 1986 staff report from the House of Representatives' Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance sheds some light on the
increase in institutional holdings:
While there was a significant increase in pension fund holdings of corporate stock
and other financial assets in the 1950s when many companies joined industry leaders
such as General Motors in forming pension plans, much of the recent high level of
growth reflects the impact of the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974. From the perspective of securities markets, the enactment
of ERISA was landmark legislation in two respects.
Because it required the liabilities of pension fund sponsors (employers) to beneficiaries (employees) be funded, it resulted in a substantial increase in purchases of
long-term financial assets-particularly corporate stocks and bonds-and thus a higher
level of capital formation than would have otherwise occurred. Because it increased the
amount of saving through deferred compensation, it contributed to a shift in savings
patterns that reduced the amount of direct savings by individuals (and thus the share of
outstanding corporate stocks held by individual investors) while increasing the share of
financial assets controlled by institutional investors.65
The drawback of the steady flow of cash from new contributions on the one
hand and capital appreciations of stock and bond holdings, sweetened by dividend and interest payments on the other hand, however, is the growing restriction
of maneuverability of the accumulated assets. It becomes increasingly difficult to
unload huge blocks of securities and funnel the proceeds to tentatively more
efficient and profitable ventures. Harrison J. Goldwin, former comptroller of
New York City and co-chair of the Council of Institutional Investors, describes
the paradoxical situation he and his brethren at pension funds are confronted
with: "We're not in a position to sell our stock. We own stock in 1,350 corporations. We could sell a given company here or there. But we've got to reinvest
66
the money."
Although the financial services industry developed the block trading mechanism to alleviate the threatened loss of salability of large holdings in securities,67
the problem still remains that an immediate oversupply of a certain stock or bond

64. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 61, at 58.
65. Memorandum from T. E. Wirth, chair, to the members of the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance (Mar. 17, 1986)
(regarding hearing on pension funds in the capital markets: the impact of corporate governance,
trading activity, and beneficiaries).
66. Quoted in Nussbaum & Dobrzynski, supra note 63, at 104.
67. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 61, at 59-60.
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depresses its market value and generates unnecessary losses for the holder. Thus,
restructuring a diversified portfolio with massive positions is a delicate task that
cannot be executed all at once. Rather it needs careful foresight and patience to
complete a (creeping) series of market transactions. A recent empirical study has
particularly proven that erratic churning is consistently inferior to a low-turnover
investment strategy. 68
B.

FIDUCIARY DUTY OF "LoNG-TRMiSM"

In the face of the aforementioned pocketbook constraints that bond the institutional investor to the assets in its portfolio, it is no accident that fund managers
resort to the alternative to invade the exclusive policy purview of management.
Accordingly, Robert A. G. Monks, head of Institutional Shareholder Services
-a pension fund consulting firm in Washington, D.C.-and former administrator of ERISA formulates the objective and the action plan in the same breath:
"We use the proxy machinery reluctantly, to get management's attention. But we
really look forward to a cooperative long-term arrangement between management and owners." 69 The proxy voting system is designed to be administered as
a stimulant to cure the much discussed managerial disease of "short-termism,"
with adverse consequences for corporate stability, business planning, and the
long-range viability and competitiveness of the corporation. 7 °
However, the practice to date appears to belie the merits of such an approach.
The ultimate question is how to reconcile the increasing mismatch of two competing sets of equally valid and more than often incompatible objectives. 71 On
the one hand, the corporate managers must carry out their duty of care to identify
and implement positive not present value projects to further the company's
growth and prosperity. However, the professional institutional investors, on the
other hand, are charged with fiduciary responsibility to maximize profits for their

68. The study, undertaken by SEI Corp., captured the time frame from 1981 to 1986. The
average ROI for low-turnover portfolios was 15.2 percent, while volatile portfolios averaged 13.5
percent. But it is noteworthy that neither strategy could consistently outperform the S&P 500 Index
that boomed within the same period at an 20 percent annual rate. See Nussbaum & Dobrzynski, supra
note 63, at 104.
69. Quoted in Nancy J. Perry, Who Runs Your Company Anyway?, FORTUNE, Sept. 12, 1988, at
140, 142.
70. Lowenstein & Millstein, supra note 18, at 741. That competition among many managers
leads each to seek "a short-term premium for a portfolio stock," even though they recognize that
they forgo a significant profit potential inherent in a buy-and-hold policy is a common theme in
corporate law doctrine. See Martin Lipton & Stephen A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The QuinquennialElection of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 207 (1991) (citing
other authorities).
71. Statement of J. C. Wilcox on the occasion of a roundtable discussion about The Proxy and
the Institutional Investor: Examining Problems of Present and Blueprint for Future, PENSION &
INVESTMENT AGE, Mar. 19, 1990, at 17.
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beneficiaries. 72 This market-oriented agenda has precipitated accusations by
management that institutional investors are not "owners" of the corporation in
any traditional sense, since their nearly uniform decisions to sell in tender situations evince short-term "speculation."
When looked at more closely, this line of reasoning deserves skeptical consideration because it rests on the almost axiomatic assumption of passivity as the
capital supplier's first duty: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it!" Specifically, the wave
of takeovers that began in the late 1970s requires a rethinking of the covenant
that exists between investors and corporate management. The phenomenon of
bid premiums of on average 80 percent 73 ineluctably implies profit potential
above the bid price, since investors are supposed to behave in an economically
rational manner. If the future cash flow to recoup the cost of capital and an
individually determined profit margin can be ascertained by the greenmailers and
the arbitrageurs, it is likewise an opportunity that can be seized by institutional
investors. They have the economic muscle to spot the intrinsic potential and to
alert the board of directors so as to bring in the new management talent needed
to realize this potential.
Overall, however, institutional investors perform their fiduciary duty better by
retaining their stake in a corporation and helping to secure genuine improved
performance of the corporate assets rather than abandoning one short-term ' in74
vestment in pursuit of another. For this concept of "relationship investment
to be implemented effectively, it is of crucial importance for the shareholders that
the following two parameters are met. First, regular, and when necessary, prompt
satisfaction of the need of adequate information as to the operation and the
financial status of the company should be made; 75 and second, shareholders
should be allowed unhindered judgment of the board's responsibilities to keep
abreast with the product market and to rejuvenate itself timely. 76 Whether to

72. Cf. Morton Klevan, FiduciaryDuty and Proxy Voting, 7 ANN. REV. OF BANKING L. 229-36
(1988); Ronald M. Machold, Fiduciary Prudence: A Practical View, 7 ANN. REV. BANKING L.

275-80 (1988).
73. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 61, at 121.

74. This concept is spelled out in more detail in Jonathan Charkham, The American Corporation
and the InstitutionalInvestor: Are There Lessons from Abroad?:Hands Across the Sea, COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 765, 770-72 (1988). For recent refutation, see Taylor, supra note 62, at 80-82 who argues
that the expertise gap renders it almost impossible to realize a direct communication with large
shareholders and corporate managers. In order to close the gap he advocates the idea of hiring
knowledgeable agents acting on behalf of the institutional investors. The idea of creating a core of
professional directors is also advocated in Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the
Outside Director:An Agenda for InstitutionalInvestors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 883-92 (1991), and

Coffee, supra note 60, at 1359-62. The pertinent counterarguments against this model of collegial
monitoring are offered infra notes 101-05 & accompanying text.
75. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 61, at 211.

76. This implies a reinternalization of the "pruning deadwood" effect that until recently fell
within the domain of the (external) market for corporate control. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 6 1, at
124-25. The "pruning deadwood" theory is based on the efficient capital market hypothesis. It
argues that hostile takeovers systematically increase productivity and managerial efficiency. "Bidders pay large premiums for target companies, and since in an efficient market everything else is
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sponsor specific proxy resolutions has to be decided according to the degree of
congruence with those two criteria.
III. The Four Cornerstones of the Legal Framework
of the Interaction between Institutional
Investors and Corporate Management
A.

CORPORATE DIALOGUE

The first step to overcome the apparent chasm between owners and managers
is the establishment of profound and continuing channels of communication.
What is urgently needed is the forum and the occasion-the time and the placefor such dialogue. These are the procedural prerequisites to gradually reducing
the current prevailing distrust on both sides, which causes a considerable amount
of social cost. 7 7 Being familiar with each other's needs and interests helps to
mitigate much of the conflict that David Walker, formerly the executive director
of the Bank of England and presently the head of the U.K.'s Securities and
Investments Board, summed up as follows:
The point is obvious enough that a major investor cannot take a mature view about the
future of a company unless he has some first-hand knowledge of the quality of the
Board.... Equally, it is very unsatisfactory for a Board to labour under the impression
that major shareholders would not support long-term projects when the matter had not
been discussed with them.78
Thus, fund managers have not only the right, but also the obligation vis-a-vis
their beneficiaries, to be sufficiently well informed about the corporation's business plan to ensure that substantial changes in the firm's investment strategies,
for example, expansion of the production capacity, or the allocation of the
research and development budget, which might depress the earnings per share
ratio are communicated in a timely fashion. 79 Ongoing exchange of information
instead of polarization becomes an inevitable necessity for investors and corporate managers once 'both parties become aware of their mutual interest in the
performance of the underlying business operations. In the long run and for the
economy as a whole, financial profits are not worth the paper they are written on
if they were not preceded, or at least will be succeeded, in the foreseeable future
80
by business profits.
already reflected in the price of the shares, the bidders must be contemplating improved management,
better use of resources, or some useful synergies." Id. at 251 (glossary); see also Louis Lowenstein,
Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 306

(1983) (arguing that "the tender offer process resembles more a random selection process than the
disciplined pruning .. .").
77. Statement of A. Oliver on the occasion of a roundtable discussion in The Proxy and the
Institutional Investor: Examining Problems of Present and Blueprint for Future, supra note 71, at 17.
78. Quoted in Company Boards: Wanted: A Cure for Board Stiffness. THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 20,

1986, at 126.
79. Lowenstein & Milistein, supra note 18, at 748.
80. Id. at 745.
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The second step on the procedural level is the contractual or statutory imposition of confidential voting in proxy contests. This will place institutional investors and activist groups on a more equal footing with corporate management. 8 1 Apart from alleviating the present bias of the proxy machinery in
management's favor, it will protect the shareholders against coercive pressure to
take sides in critical voting questions and the integrity of their individual privacy
rights.8 2 Although it can be argued that due to the size and diversification of their
portfolios, money managers are much less vulnerable to the threat of retribution
than employee shareholders, 83 it can also be seen that fund managers are considerably diverted from their genuine asset management task by being flooded
with written and oral proxy solicitations. Confidential voting will avoid this kind
of negative externality.
Another false objection put forward is a textbook example of the so-called
"nirvana fallacy." 84 While the confidential voting process undoubtedly entails a
certain probability of error and mischief,8 5 it does not follow that this proposal
86
should be jettisoned in favor of independent shareholder nominated directors.
The proper comparison is between the costs and benefits of both proposals for
reform. 87 Whereas confidential voting increases the administrative costs generated by complicating the proxy machinery, the recruitment of suitable board
members creates a new bureaucratic layer with increasing agency costs, let alone
ex ante incurred information and transaction costs, which taken together, are
deemed to exceed the relatively easily ascertainable costs of the voting tabulation
process by a specialized private firm.88

81. The unfair advantages over the shareholders were enumerated by James Heard, like
Michael C. Jensen, director of Analysis Group, Inc., which, en passant, had been retained by one

of the Belzberg affiliates to provide advice both in respect to SB No. 13 10 and the proxy fight against
Armstrong. Heard listed: (i) management's complete control of the voting system; (ii) management's

unlimited access to corporate funds in soliciting proxies; (iii) restricted shareholder access to the
proxy statement; (iv) no original nomination right for dissident shareholders; (v) no reimbursement
of shareholder expenses associated with their own proxy solicitations; and (vi) no shareholder right
to confidential voting or to independent tabulation of voting results. Securities, Witnesses at Hearing
Split Over Confidential Proxy Voting, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 148, at A-5, A-6
(Aug. 3, 1989) [hereinafter Securities, Witnesses].

82. Id.
83. See id. (statement of Richard Foley while representing the United Shareholders Association,
which had been founded by T. Boone Pickens, Jr.).
84. The "nirvana fallacy" is discussed in Harold Demsetz, Information & Efficiency: Another
Viewpoint, 12 J. L. & ECON. 1-22 (1969).
85. See the quotation of Roderick Hills (former SEC chairman and now managing partner of
Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irwin, Washington) in Securities, Witnesses, supra note 81.
86. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 74, at 880-82; LOWENSTEIN, supra note 61, at
205-14.
87. Fischel, supra note 60, at 1272.
88. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in CorporateLaw, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 395,
425 (1983).
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SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL OF SPECIFIC

CORPORATE INVESTMENT DECISIONS

Shifting the focus on the substance of monitoring rights for institutional investors, the eye falls on section III of the so-called "Shareholder Bill of Rights"
(the Bill). 8 9 The Bill was promulgated by the Council of Institutional Investors
(the Council) in April 1986. The Council is an association of employee benefit
plans, state and local agencies that oversee such plans, and not-for-profit foundations and endowments. It is grounded on the belief that more powerful investors can effectively orchestrate the voting of proxies in concert and, as a result,
the benefits from improved performance will inure to each investor according to
the size of its investment (positive externality).
In essence, the provisions of section III of the Bill draw a distinct line between
financial and operational decisions. The latter are outright acknowledged as the
prerogative of corporate management. 90 From the former segment is extracted an
enumerative and exhaustive catalogue of five specific decision-areas that are
declared to be subject to approval by a majority shareholder vote: greenmail,
poison pills, golden parachutes, disposition of certain assets (crown jewels), and
incurrence of excessive debt (junk bonds). 91
A sixth reserved decision-area is a blend of procedural matters, i.e., the
election and removal of directors, convocation of special meetings on shareholders' request, and procedure for fixing a record date. Clearly, it does not fit in the
given systematic order. Notwithstanding this inconsistency, it gives expression to
and underscores the fundamental insight that substantive right concessions have
to be balanced with procedural safeguards to develop their optimal effect.
The list of veto transactions deserves approval. It avoids abrupt distortions of
the stock price precipitated by unexpected financial and investment decisions.
Thus, the volatility of the normally concerted, short-term myopic institutional
buying and selling is smoothly leveled out and the92unwinding of large holdings
can be stretched out over a longer period of time.
Furthermore, an intervening control of the equity and debt structure of the firm
grants the shareholders a disciplining influence on the risk-taking propensity of
the business managers. This need to monitor the financing and investing activities follows from the economics of moral hazard in the absence of the "Wall
Street Rule." 93 The managerial incentive to pursue, in the eyes of the shareholders, overly risky projects is decreased by a contractual veto power. The

89. Appendix: Shareholder Bill of Rights, (Revised as of Sept. 7, 1988) COLOM. Bus. L. REV.
759-64 (1988) [hereinafter The Bill]. Heard, supra note 23, at 246-47.
90. See The Bill, supra note 89, at 761 (explanatory notes).
91. Id. at 760-61.
92. Robert S. Waill, From Weak Hands in Strong Hands, TRUSTS & ESTATES, Jan. 1981, at
52, 53.
93. See the extensive discussion supra notes 61-68 & accompanying text.
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economic savings of bankruptcy costs are more than worth the administrative
94
costs and costs of error associated with this specific direct monitoring device.
D.

"BOARDMAILING"

95

Instead of conceding institutional investors the right of consent in any corporate decision that will have a significant financial effect upon a corporation and
its shareholders, one might be inclined to take the idea of shareholder democracy
a step further and reverse the modem theory of a firm as an agency relationship
with a strict separation of investment and management 96 in revitalizing the
classic shareholder-as-manager model. Representatives of institutional investors
would be elected as members of the board and, as a result, enjoy the authority
to effect corporate business decisions. In drawing a parallel to the ancient Greeks
who regarded the citizens' full-time dedication to participation as a conditio sine
qua non for the success of democracy, Nell Minow, general counsel of Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. and executive director of the Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on Corporate Governance at Yeshiva University's of Cardozo
Law School, has recently proclaimed the species of pension fund managers as the
"ideal stewards of America's corporations," since they "could devote their
entire working
hours to their equivalent of citizenship-corporate gover97
nance."
Such a metaphoric statement, of course, flatters the ego of fund managers. In
practice the idea that any of them will seriously consider doing the job of
corporate managers is hardly conceivable. This has little to do with the widely
98
accepted psychological insight that most people tend to shy away from power.
Even if this were not true for the generic group of money managers, the assumption of corporate leadership would still run afoul of the fundamental economic principle of division of labor. The strength of the corporate form is that it
enables individuals who can supply capital but lack managerial ability to invest
while simultaneously allowing professional managers who lack personal wealth

94. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. Cm. L. REV. 89, 94, 114 (1985).
95. Quotation ascribed to Carl C. Icahn when he acknowledged defeat in the spectacular Texaco
proxy fight after the board of directors, bowing to necessity, had secured support of institutional
investors by making the until then unprecedented concession of granting them a greater role in
electing directors. Stratford Sherman, Pushing Corporate Boards to Be Better, FORTUNE, July 18,
1988, at 58.
96. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976); Eugene F. Fama &
Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & EON. 301-25 (1983).
97. Nell Minow, Shareholders Awakening to Their Power; Institutional Investors: Sleeping
Giants?, LEGAL TIMEs, Apr. 25, 1988, at 16.
98. This critical issue was rightly pointed out by E. Regan, New York State Comptroller and sole
trustee of New York's state and local fund, on the occasion of a roundtable discussion. The Proxy and
the InstitutionalInvestor: Examining Problems of Present and Blueprint for Future, supra note 71.
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to start and operate enterprises. 99 Investors would be hurt rather than helped if
they interfered with corporate governance that does not fall in the domain of their
genuine expertise. 100 Moreover, wearing two hats as money and industrial manager exposes the investor to the reproach of self-contradictory behavior. The
guiding managerial principle to focus on core businesses is in no way unique to
enterprises but is inherent in any agency relationship where the agent has less
incentive to maximize wealth than if he himself were the principal.
From the perspective of the institutional investors, the key issue is effective
monitoring. They have to reassert their original right as a function of ownership
to elect qualified directors to the board, which is one of the most vexing problems
of corporate governance. 10 1 Since the latter are entrusted with the efficient coordination of the various production inputs, such as capital, labor, and raw
materials, "[t]he corporate managers of today must be as sophisticated in managing their debt and equity capacities as they are managing their plant capacity.
There would in fact be no room for corporate raiders and arbitragers" 10 2 if a
screening, monitoring, and incentive system were developed that retained corporate managers committed to the increase of shareholder value and, conversely,
punished shirkers with a tendency to appropriate perquisites out of the firm's
treasure house for their own consumption. To achieve this goal institutional
investors do not need a voice in the boardroom. On the contrary, direct representation could import additional agency problems ("Who monitors the monitors? )103 and conflicts of interest because of legally, politically, socially, or
ethically imposed divergencies from the economic theorem of wealth maximi-

zation. 104

In application of the Pareto principle of welfare economics, investors' welfare
is maximized by a corporate governance structure that permits unequal distribution of gains from business decisions, subject to the constraint that no investor be
made worse off by the action. Reliance on the fiduciary principle, as refined
above, 10 5 appears to be socially superior to direct monitoring since its deterrent
effect, combined with the various market forces, preserves the gains resulting
from the delegation of the decision-making authority and the division of labor,
99. M. Dooley, Controlling Giant Enterprises: The Question of Legitimacy, in

CORPORATE

GOvERNANCE: PAST AND FuTuRE 28, 38 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1982).

100. This fear of a boomerang effect is the reason why institutional investors have traditionally
shown a lack of enthusiasm for a more active role in corporate governance. See J. A. C. Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes: Reflections on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights, 8
HoFsTritA L. REV. 183, 184-88 (1979).

101. Sherman, supra note 95, at 64.
102. Ronald M. Machold, The American Corporation and the Institutional Investor: Are There
Lessons from Abroad?: A Domestic Perspective, COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 751, 757 (1988).
103. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J.
698, 701 (1982).
104. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 61, at 215-16 also refers to the possible exposure to lawsuits.
105. See supra part II1.C. In the terminology of Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 103, at 702
this is a practical example of "re-contracting" the standard legal terms of the fiduciary rule.
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while limiting the ability of incumbent management to further their own interests
at the expense of the investors.
IV. Implications for the Players and
Dynamics for Corporate Germany
A.

REAPPORTIONMENT OF STOCK PROPERTY DUE TO DIVERGENCIES
BETWEEN THE NATIONAL OLD AGE PENSION SCHEMES

1. The Heavy Hitters
It is common knowledge that the savings behavior of people varies from
country to country. People prefer different forms of investments and each country
has its own system of how to finance the provision for old age and the corresponding pension schemes. Against this background, Anglo-American, as well
as Japanese and Swedish pension funds, stand out with a spectacular growth
record. Among this leading quartet, the U.S. pension funds have the deepest
pockets of the world, with more than $2.6 trillion in 1989. This number corresponds to the gross national product (GNP) of Japan. The vast investmentseeking capital has substantially contributed to the rise of the global stock markets in the 1980s because a major part was used for stock purchases, and the
higher demand forced up prices.
2. The German Stock Market: Cockaigne of
Arbitrage Opportunities
In the meantime, U.S. and other institutional investors had discovered the
German stock market. 10 6 They discovered that the stock quotations were an
inadequate measure both of the liquidation and the going concern value of the
underlying corporate assets. By way of example, the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), which operates the old-age pension scheme for 200,000
college teachers and professors, beneficially held shares of German companies at
the end of 1989 worth nearly DM 1 billion, the largest portion of which was tied
up in shares of Allianz AG, Munich, the largest European insurance
company,
07
representing a market capitalization of nearly DM 110 million. '
Put differently, U.S. pension funds do not restrict the geographic spread of
their portfolio strategy to companies in their home country like IBM, Hewlett &
Packard, General Motors, Ford, Johnson & Johnson, and Philip Morris, which
are also competing on the German product market through significant subsidiaries. Rather, they make direct investments in publicly traded companies incorporated in Germany. Thus, the returns on those investments flow in the distribution
to the beneficiaries of the U.S. pension funds.
106. See Heard, supra note 23, at 248; S. Ulrich, Shareholder Power, MANAGER MAGAZIN,
May 1991, at 121, 128.
107. See ANNUAL REPORT 1989, at 41 et seq.; see also W. Wilhelm, Manager unter Druck,
MANAGER MAGAZIN, May 1991, at 100, 115.
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It may be supposed that the capital interest of foreign pension funds in German
blue chips will grow, because the number and size of share issues on the U.S.
stock market does not match the rapidly rising investment needs of the institutional investor clientele. What is of utmost importance is the invention and
innovation of new financial products.
3. Legal Fragmentationof the Globalized Capital Markets
The enhanced interest of foreign institutional investors in the German stock
market is consistent with the globalization of the economy, which is, among
other things, reflected in the globalization of the ownership. Multinational companies with a corresponding multinational dispersion of their share capital enjoy
the benefit of a better local acceptance. At the same time, the phenomenon of
globalization opens new avenues for equity and debt financing. What must not be
overlooked, however, is that the factual investment policy of and the legal
framework for the institutional investors are still disparate. While in the United
States, Japan, and the United Kingdom, the formation and allocation of capital
for retirement benefit purposes is mainly channeled through insurance companies
and pension funds, which invest a large proportion of the capital in stock,
Germany has no equivalent group of institutional investors. 108 Certainly, the
local insurance companies have significantly increased their stock holdings in the
past. In the same vein, it must be acknowledged that more private savings are
devoted to investments in shares and other forms of securities to provide for
retirement. To this end pension reserves might not only be used for the selffinancing of the company, but also for the implementation of employee stock
ownership plans. The fundamental difference, however, is the financing of the
German social security system, where no reserves are created. Instead, the future
generation bears the burden of financing the old-age benefit scheme. The central
issue then is how to reconcile the growing impact of the foreign pension funds
with the traditional concepts of corporate governance in Germany.
B.

EROSION OF POWER OF GENERAL SHAREHOLDERS'

MEETING

The number of complaints about the nonexercise of voting rights at general
shareholders' meetings is steadily on the rise. 109 For example, when Deutsche
Bank, Germany's preeminent universal bank, held its general meeting, only 41
percent of the total outstanding share capital was represented and when the vote
108. See Michael Hauck, in GELDVERFASSUNG UND ORDNUNGSPOLITIK 43 (Hahn ed., 1989);
Michael Hauck, in PENSIONSKASSEN UND BORSEN 36 et seq. (Arbeitskreis der Deutschen Wertpapierb6rsen ed., 1989); Hans J. Mertens, F6rderungvon, Schutz vor, Zwang zu Obernahmengeboten, 35
AG 252, 254 (1990).
109. Dirk Schmalenbach, Federal Republic of German, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at 109, 122. A similar development was observed in Japan until the reform
act in corporations law in 1981. See Maeda, supra note 3: "The general shareholders' meeting of the
big enterprises were only poorly attended, extremely short and nothing but mere formalities."
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to lift the 10 percent ceiling of the voting power came, the relative number fell
to only 37 percent. Similarly, disappointing numbers were recorded at the 1989
annual meetings of Deutsche Babcock AG, Oberhausen and Continental AG,
Hannover with 41.98 percent and 43 percent respectively. Hoesch AG, Dortmund surpassed every other company with a disastrous 27 percent. "lO
The decline at annual shareholders' meetings has a host of reasons. First of all,
small shareholders have evidently lost any interest in "their" company and are
content with themselves in the role of coupon cutters. The shareholders' associations can compensate for this deficiency of representation only to a limited
extent. Second, in contrast with their domestic counterparts, foreign institutional
investors often abstain from using the proxy voting machine. Domestic capital
investment companies are normally represented by subsidiaries of affiliated companies of commercial banks or insurance companies. Under those circumstances
the lack of representation does not pose a problem as in the case of all other
domestic institutional investors.
The picture is less happy when looking at the group of foreign institutional
investors. Why they give a wide berth to general meetings even though their
property interests are directly affected by the shareholders' resolutions is open to
speculation. The possible explanations span from a lack of interest in the problems in the context of the deposit of shares, "' the preservation of the unrestricted
right of disposal in light of the temporary impediment that the deposit of shares
is a prerequisite for the voting power at the shareholders' meeting, 1 2 to the
intentional disguising of the stock ownership.
The massive shareholder absence produces random majorities. Even worse, it
allows organized minority groups an inadequate influence. In the past, proxy
voting initially enabled commercial banks to bundle the dispersed interests of
small shareholders. Second, it facilitated the treasuring of profits for internal
financing of future growth opportunities,' 13 which met with the long-term orientation of the capital owners. Third, proxy voting ensured an adequate counseling and monitoring of management through representation on the supervisory
board. Fourth, the proxy voting system warranted solid majority decisions.
Particularly, this last function cannot be accomplished under the above described changes in the distribution of corporate ownership. Nowadays we have to
ask the question: who will substitute for the shareholders in monitoring the
business managers given that the former are not able to overcome their lethargy

110. The then chairman of the executive board, Detlef Karsten Rohwedder, commented laconically that he could make neither heads or tails of the low attendance. He suspected that one-third of
Hoesch's share capital was in the hands of foreign investors who naturally (sic!) would not allow any
voting authorization. See DAS WERTPAPIER 783 (1989).
111. But see the sharp criticism by Otto Graf Lambsdorff, DAS WERTPAPIER 1346 (1989).
112. F. Wilhelm Christians, Der Aktionar und sein Stinmmrecht, 35 AG 47 (1990).
113. See Klaus Piltz, Gewinnverwendungspolitik der Aktiengesellschaft, in FINANZIERUNGSHANDBuCH 627 (F. Wilhelm Christians ed., 2d ed. 1988).
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and willingly or unwillingly have to resign from their responsible position as
"watchdogs of last resort"? 1 4 Beyond any doubt, the shareholders' meeting as
the ultimate decision-making and supervising organ is currently going through a
serious state of crisis. 115

The immediate solution to this fundamental problem is to draw the attention of
the institutional investors to their responsibility. This has already been done in
the past, but only with modest success. Apart from the minor and technical
difficulty of ascertaining proper addresses, German corporations and commercial
banks have repeatedly reported that foreign institutional investors did not even
reply to the reminders.
If "soft" communications are ineffective in the near future, political considerations will have to focus on the legal options by drawing on the experience of
the foreign corporate lawmakers. In 1981 Japan, for example, introduced the
written voting system for large corporations with two conjunctive minimum
threshold values of an issued share capital of at least 500 million yen and at least
1,000 shareholders entitled to vote. Accordingly, the corporations are obliged to
send a written company report together with a proxy card to each registered
shareholder. Other possible solutions might be to lower the necessary quora, to
institute a representative shareholder committee,116 or to adopt the U.S. proxy
voting system.' 1 7 The last resort would be the forfeiture of the8 right of profit in
case of lack of representation at the shareholders' meeting.''
C.

THE

GENERAL SHAREHOLDERS' MEETING AS THE PIVOTAL

POINT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The insufficient representation of shareholders at general meetings is only one
of the problems growing out of the increased stock participation of foreign
institutional investors in German publicly traded companies. A possible scenario
114. The phrase is from Uwe H. Schneider, Strimmrechtsbeschrankungen im amerikanischen
Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrecht,in BErTRAGE ZUM HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT. FESTSCHRIFr FUR

FRrrz RrrrNER ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG 613,

627 (Wolfgang Lwisch et al. eds.,

1991), who

articulates his strong scruples against the tacit understanding of the shareholders' key role in the
successful governance of the corporation. That the energized participation of corporate governance
by institutional investors is akin to reversing this trend is argued by Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching
Agents: The Promise and Limits of InstitutionalShareholderVoice, 40 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming
1992). For the function of the shareholder within the regulated system of competition, see generally
BERNHARD GROSSFELD, AKTENGESELLSCHAFr, UNTERNEHMENSKONZENTRATION

UND KLEINAKTIONAR
191 (1968); ULRICH IMMENGA, AKTIENGESELLSCHAFr, AKTIONARSINTERESSEN UND INSTITUTIONELLE
ANLEGER 6 (1971); MARCUS LuTTER, DER AKTIONAR IN DER MARKTWIRTSCHAFr 26 (1973).

115. For the paramount importance of authorized voting rights in favor of the commercial banks,
with respect to the efficiency of the general shareholders' meeting, see KORBER, DIE STIMMRECHTSVERTRETUNG DURCH KREDITINSTrrUTE 32 n. 15 et seq. (1989); Schmalenbach, supra note 109, at 117.

116. See LuTTER, supra note 114, at 53.
117. Cf. Philipp Mohring, Proxy-Stimmrecht und geltendes deutsches Recht, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR
ERNST GESSLER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG AM 5. MARZ 1970 at 127 et seq. (Kurt Ballerstedt & Wolfgang
Hefermehl eds., 1970).
118.

See Schneider, supra note 13, at 322.
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for the future development could also be a revitalization of the shareholders'
meeting associated with enhanced supervision of the management by the shareholders and a stronger emphasis on shareholder value maximization instead of
entrenchment. The driving force behind such a movement towards "shareholder
democracy"' 19 would possibly be the foreign institutional
investors with their
20
financial potency as a means of exerting pressure.1
Such external impetus would have the approval of F. Wilhelm Christians,
chair of the supervisory board of Deutsche Bank, who, on the occasion of the
thirtieth anniversary of the foundation of the Association for the Protection of
Small Shareholders (Schutzgemeinschaft der Kleinaktionare e.V.), uttered the
view that the voting right was the proper tool for the shareholder to gain an
influence not only on business policy but also on the configuration of the executive floor. 12' The current practice of publicly traded companies to fill vacancies
on the board by co-option would be replaced by a more flexible elective method
based on collaboration with the shareholders.
Whether the participatory management model will yield a better result for the
shareholders remains to be seen. Before a definite answer can be given, a number
of intricate questions need to be settled. It may suffice to cite two examples.
First, the present set of fiduciary duties' 22 has to be scrutinized for eventual
modification and refinement. The second problem area touches on the flow of
communication between management, institutional investors, and ordinary investors. More precisely, what are the legal remedies necessary to cure the inevitable asymmetry of information when inside knowledge is exclusively divulged
to institutional investors; when they get details outside the shareholders' meeting
that were previously refused to small shareholders during the meeting; 123 or

119. See FRANK D. EMERSON & FRANKLIN C. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY A BROADER
OUTLOOK FOR CORPORATIONS (1954); Bernhard Freiherr von Falkenhausen, Die amerikanische
Aktionirs-Demokratie, 15 AG 91-95, 122-128 (1960).
120. See J. I. Mahari, Ruckkehr zur Aktionarsherrschaft als unternehmerische Chance und rechtspolitischerImpuls: Vorstosse zur Beendigung der Machtdelegation an das Management anhand

der Entwicklung der Take-overs in den USA, 62 SCHWEIZERISCHE
ANONYME SUISSE [SAG]

AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT/LA SOCIITI
DAS TREUHANDMODELL DESIN-

14-29 (1988); see also GONTER H. ROTH,

VESTMENTRECHTS. EINE ALTERNATIVE ZUR AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT? (1973).

121. Christians, supra note 112.
122. Cf. DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS (3d ed. 1989).
123. This preferential treatment, however, is burdened with the risk of responsibility towards the
other shareholders. In the United States, this situation imposes a fiduciary duty upon the controlling
shareholder. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING HANDBOOK 81 (1987).
Institutional investors could also come under the category of primary insiders as defined in the
Council Directive 89/592 of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 1989
O.J. (L 334) 30. The personal qualification of possessing inside information within the meaning of
Article 2, Paragraph I of this Directive, "by virtue of (a) holding in the capital of the issuer," does
not appear to be limited to controlling shareholders or to those with a significant stake in the equity.
Rather, it could also embrace all those who use their significant clout as a leverage for obtaining
price-sensitive information. See EDDY WYMEERSCH, The Insider Trading Prohibition in the EC
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when management and particular institutional investors make arrangements, for
example to the effect that the latter will be allowed one seat on the former's board
of directors on the condition not to participate in a hostile takeover, but rather to
side with the target company?
D.

FUEL TO THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

The investment decisions of institutional investors have substantial influence
in the market of corporate control. The small elite of executive board members
of the largest commercial banks is nearly ubiquitous on the supervisory boards of
the publicly traded nonbanking companies. The direct stockholdings by "their"
bank, 124 proxy voting rights and the voting rights of the shares in the portfolios
of the affiliated capital management companies provide them with a strong power
base. Together with intimate firm and industry specific knowledge, the influential
25
role of bank representatives helps to smooth corporate control transactions. 1
Once the financial distress of a company becomes apparent to the board, a
friendly takeover can be initiated without much fuss. This was demonstrated by
the reorganization of the steel-making Krupp concern in 1967 and by the telecommunications and electrical appliances producer AEG after 1979 coming under the wing of the cash-rich Daimler-Benz AG which, in turn, is dominated by
Deutsche Bank AG through the largest stake in the company amounting to more
26
than 28 percent of the outstanding stock. 1
This form of deal-making is not likely to disappear in future, but it will be
complemented in view of a different legal framework and the appearance of new
market participants. That the new EEC regulation on corporate takeovers 127 was
Member States: A Comparative Overview, in EUROPEAN

INSIDER DEALING-LAW AND PRACTICE 65,
76 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1991). For a broader overview of the efforts to
harmonize the insider trading laws in the Member States of the European Communities in view of the
approaching completion of the internal market on December 31, 1992, see Thomas C. Paefgen,
Insiderhandel im Spannungsverh/Jltnis zwischen gemeinschaftsrechtlicherIntegration und nationalstaatlicherRegulation-e pluribus unum, 36 AG 380-96 (1991).
124. As the chairman of the German Association for the Protection of Shareholdings (Deutsche
Schutzvereinigung fir Wertpapierbesitz [DSW]) and leader of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Otto
Graf Lambsdorff points out, it is a self-evident sign of the different attitude towards the distribution
of roles in corporate governance that German members of the executive board (Vorstand) talk of
"their company" while their American counterparts report about "your company." See Wilhelm,
supra note 107, at 121.
125. From this finding, it obviously requires a great leap to subscribe to the validity of the popular
thesis that characterizes the relationship between the big banks and industry in the Federal Republic
of Germany in terms of the power of the banks over industry. For a more differentiated view of this
century-long debate, see Josef Esser, Bank Power in West Germany Revised, 13 W. EUR. POL. 17, 24
et seq., 28 et seq. (1990).
126. See Hans H. Kallfass, The American Corporationand the Institutional Investor: Are There
Lessons from Abroad? The German Experience, COL. BuS. L. REv. 775, 790-91 (1988).
127. Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on Control of Concentrations between
Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1. This "merger control" regulation was amended by Council
Regulation 2367/90, 1990 O.J. (L 219) 5, and, as a result, was republished in a corrected version as
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corrigendum to Council Regulation 4064/89 EEC on Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13.
Cf. Oliver Axster, Die EuropaischeFusionskontrolle, FESTSCHRIFr FUR KARLHEINZ QUACK ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG AM 3. JANUAR 1991, at 567, 572 et seq. (Harm P. Westermann & Wolfgang Rosener
eds., 1991); J. BLANK, EUROPAISCHE FUSIONSKONTROLLE IM RAHMEN DER ARTr. 85, 86 DES EWGVERTRAGES (1991); Cornelis C. Canenbley & Andreas Weitbrecht, EEC Merger Control:A Preliminary Analysis, 18 INT'L Bus. L. 104 et seq. (1990); Joel Davidow, Competition Policy, Merger
Control and the European Community's 1992 Program, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 28 et seq.
(1991); Thomas C. Ebenroth & K. W. Lange, Die Auswirkungen der EuropaischenFusionskontrollverordnung auf das bundesdeutsche Recht der Unternehmens Zusammenschlusse, 46 BETRIEBSBERATER [BB] 845 et seq. (1991); W. Elland, The Mergers Control Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89,
I1 EuR. COMPETMON L. REV. [ECLR] 11l1-18 (1990); W. Elland, The Merger Control Regulation
and Its Effect on National Merger Controls and the Residual Application of Articles 85 and 86, 12
ECLR 19-28 (1991); Frank L. Fine, EC Merger Control: An Analysis of the New Regulation, 11
ECLR 47-51 (1990); Horst-Peter Gbtting & Werner Nikowitz, EEC Merger Control:Distinguishing
Concentrative Joint Ventures from Cooperative Joint Ventures, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 185-204
(1989-90); N. Herzig et al., System und Schwachen der Fusionsrichtlinie,Supp. 12, DER BETRIEB
[DB] (1991); G. Hitzler, Die europaische Fusionskontrolle kann beginnen, 1 EuRoPAISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFr
FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT
[EuZW] 369-71 (1990);
Helmut H61zler, EGFusionskontrolle: Konzepte und Konsequenzen, 44 WM 489-94 (1990); T. Janicki, EGFusionskontrolle auf dem Weg zur praktischen Umsetzung, 40 WIRTSCHAFr UND WETrBEWERB
[WuWI 195-205 (1990); Wolfgang Kirchhoff, Europaische Fusionskontrolle, Supp. 14, 45 BB
(1990); Martin Mendelsohn, InternationalFranchising, 3 INT'L Q. 45, 74-92 (1991); Hans M.
Mller-Laube, Europa 1992: Die europaische Fusionskontrolle--Gedanken zu einem neuen europaischen Recht, 31 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG [JuS] 184, 188 et seq. (1991); Ernst Niederleithinger, Die
europdischeFusionskontrolleund ihr Verhaltnis zum nationalenRecht: Aus der Sicht des Bundeskartellamtes, in WEtrBEWERBSPOLITIK AN DER SCHWELLE ZUM EUROPAISCHEN BINNENMARKT. REFERATE
DES XXII. FIW-SYMPOSIONs 79 et seq. (1989); Ernst Niederleithinger, Das Verhiiltnis nationalerund
europdischerKontrolle von Zusammenschlissen, 40 WuW 721-30 (1990); Ernst Niederleithinger,
Vier Prognosen zur europdischen Fusionskontrolle, in F sCHRIFr FUR KARLHEINZ QUACK ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG AM 3. JANUAR 1991, supra at 645, 646 et seq.; H. J. NIEMEYER, DIE EUROPAISCHE
FUSIONSKONTROLLVERORDNUNG (1991); D. Ridyard, An Economic Perspective on the EC Merger
Regulation, 11 ECLR 247-54 (1990); Alexander Riesenkampff, Perspektiven und Probleme der
europdiischen Fusionskontrolle, in BEITRAGE ZUM HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT. FESTSCHRIFT
FOR FRITz RrNER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG, supra note 114, 491 et seq.; Andreas R6hling, Offene
Fragen der europaischen Fusionskontrolle, 11 ZErrscHRiFr FUR WiRTSCHAFrSRECHT [ZIP] 1179 et
seq. (1990); Otto Sandrock & Elke van Arnheim, New Merger Control Rules in the EEC, 25 INT'L
LAW. 859 (1991); Peter M. Schmidhuber, Die europaischeFusionskontrolleund ihr Verhiltnis zum
nationalen Recht: Aus der Sicht der Kommission der Europiiischen Gemeinschaften, in WEMIrEWERBSPOLITIK AN DER SCHWELLE ZUM EUROPAISCHEN BINNENMARKT. REFERATE DES XXII. FIWSYMPOSIONS, supra, at 95 et seq.; Karsten Schmidt, Europaische Fusionskontrolleim System des
Rechts gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, 45 BB 1990, at 719 et seq.; Karsten Schmidt, Die europiische Fusionskontrolleund ihr Verhaltniszum nationalenRecht: Aus der Sicht der Wissenschaft,
in WETrBEWERBSPOLITIK AN DER SCHWELLE ZUM EUROPAISCHEN BINNENMARKT. REFERATE DES XXII.
FIW-SYMPOSIONS, supra, at 65 et seq.; D. Schroeder & T. A. Orter, Die neue EWGFusionskontrollverordnung, I1 ZIP 677 et seq. (1990); Winfried Tilmann, Zur EGFusionskontroll-VO 1989, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR Orro-FRiEDRICH FRHR. V. GAMM 663 et seq. (Willi
Erdmann et al. eds., 1990); James S. Venit, The "Merger" Control Regulation: Europe Comes of
Age ... or Caliban'sDinner, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 7-50 (1990); Andreas Weitbrecht, Zusammenschlusskontrolle im EuropdischenBinnenmarkt, 1 EuZW 18-21 (1990).
After little more than a year of European merger control, the first outlines of its actual application
are drawn-and material problem areas are identified-by Claus D. Ehlermann, Die europiiische
Fusionskontrolle-ersteErfahrungen,41 WuW 535-45 (1991). Mr. Ehlermann is Director General of
the "competition" Directorate General (GD IV) within the Commission of the European Communities. The so-called merger task force forms an integral part of GD IV. See also John Cook & Trevor
Soames, EEC MergerRegulation:A Practical View, 19 INT'L Bus. L. 330-35 (1991); John Cook &
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energetically fostered by the United Kingdom is not surprising because it will
fuel the market for corporate control and the huge British and U.S. pension funds
are likely to be the foremost beneficiaries. 128 Although the number of possible
takeover candidates in Germany is fairly limited,1 29 there is a growing concern
for competitive distortions due to the imbalance of financial strength of the
market participants that might have an adverse effect on enterprises of key
relevance for the German economy. Some question whether fund managers are
qualified to determine the structure of conglomerates as well as the reorganiza130
tion or even the disentangling of highly complex business combinations.

E.

DEMISE OF THE SMALL SHAREHOLDER

1. Petrification of the Stock Market
Institutional investors increasingly chart the course for stock movements.
According to a poll among U.S. private investors, 60 percent believed that
program trading is a nail in the coffin of a floating stock market and degrades the
market to the stage of creating a "casino" for large investors with billions of
dollars under their belts. 131 Small shareholders felt like passengers in a roller
coaster, lifted up on a high flight and then crashed to the ground by new investment strategies.
Moreover, the stock market might become narrow, just like the spot market for
crude oil in Amsterdam, as soon as institutional investors adopt a more steady
investment policy leaving only a small amount of shares for trade on the open

Trevor Soames, EEC Merger Regulation 11: The Appraisal Process, 19 INT'L Bus. L. 490-95
(1991); Frank L. Fine, The EEC Merger Regulation: Boom or Bust After One Year, 6 BUTLERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. [JIBFL] 533-37 (1991); Martin Heidenhain, Europaische
Fusionskontrolle gewinnt Konturen, 2 EuZW 449 (1991); H. J. Niemeyer, Unternehmenszusammenschlfisse nach Inkrafttreten der EG-Fusionskontroll-VO, 37 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN
WnIrscHAFr [RIW] 448 (1991); H. J. Niemeyer, Europaische Fusionskontrolle. Erste Umrisse einer
Verwaltungspraxis der EG-Kommission, Supp. 25, 46 BB (1991); Colin Overbury, First Experiences of European Merger Control, EuR. L. REv. 79-98 (1991); K. P. Rohardt, Die europaische
Fusionskontrolle beginnt Gestalt anzunehmen, 41 WuW 365-83 (1991); M. Siragusa & A.
Subbitto, Ein Jahr EG-Fusionstontrolle-Eine Zwischenbilanz aus der Sicht des Praktikers, 41 WuW
872-78 (1991).
128. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 324.
129. This has to do with the special structure of the German industry, with the importance of large
numbers of medium-sized and smaller but often very profitable companies (Mittelstandsuntemehmen), which mostly have the legal status of a company with limited liability (Gesellschaft mit
beschrinkter Haftung [GmbH]). While there are about 430,000 GmbHs in the Federal Republic of
Germany-including many small ones-there are only about 2,650 stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaften [AGs]), out of which only about 500 are listed. See Herbert Hansen, Ende 1990: 2682
Aktiengesellschaften, 37 AG R 290 (1991); Herbert Hansen, Die GmbH baut ihren Vorsprung als
umsatzstarkste Rechtsform aus, GMBH-RUNDSCHAU [GmbHR] 192-95 (1991).
130. J. Plender, The Limits to Institutional Power, FIN. TIMES, May 22, 1990, at 18.
131. Warren E. Buffett, How to Tame the Casino Society, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1986, at A23.
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market. 132 This is not the case yet. Rather, the Financial Executive Institute has
established in a study in 1990 that, on average, U.S. pension funds keep their
shares for only thirty months. The annual turnover of all the publicly traded
shares was 51 percent in 1987 and 38 percent in 1980, which produced annual
costs between $25-30 billion.' 33 This is roughly the same amount of capital that
was raised by means of stock issues.
However, the costly turnover is not an immutable matter of fact. On the one
hand, whether it makes sense to force up the stock price by a permanent transfer
of ownership without creating any new value is questionable. ' 34 On the other
hand, the proposal to induce long-term stock holdings by means of a graduated
capital gains tax schedule has not 1yet
been removed from the agenda of a
35
cohesive economic and fiscal policy.
2. De Facto Disenfranchisement
Institutional investors do not diminish the legal status of the small shareholders.
Indeed, the growing trend towards institutionalization of stock ownership might lead
to a revitalization of the shareholders' meeting.' 36 But it is to be feared that the small
private investor will be pressed into the role of a dividend recipient when, even in
corporations with a widely dispersed share capital, there is no chance for changing
majorities. This is the likely result once institutional investors decide to pool their
voting rights. The voting power of the small shareholder is then as worthless as if he
had put his money in a corporation with one single majority shareholder.
3. Victimization by Bust-Up Takeovers
Finally, the long-term-oriented small shareholder is in danger of falling victim
to mega-mergers and bust-up takeovers. Insufficient legal protection against
business combinations jeopardizes the minority shareholder as does insufficient
protection by capital markets against liquidation takeovers. Shareholder wealth is
37
transferred from the target to the bidder company. 1
Therefore, if the publicly traded corporation participates in the free market for
corporate control, shareholders should be granted the statutory right to take
appropriate precautionary measures against detrimental abuses of the free market
system. That is exactly what Franz Heinrich Ulrich, the former speaker of the
executive board and later chair of the supervisory board of Deutsche Bank,
indicated with respect to the introduction of the maximum voting right in 1975:
132. As to the gradual dehydration of the stock market, see FRIEDRICH KOBLER, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 171 (3d ed. 1990).
133. See PETER S. LYNCH, ONE UP ON WALL STREET 289 (1989).
134. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 323-26 (5th ed. 1990);

LYNCH,
135.
136.
137.
Offers:

supra note 133, at 283 et seq.
Cf. Block & Hoff, supra note 62; Lipton, supra note 17, at 64.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
See Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, The Returns to Acquiring Firms in Tender
Evidence from Three Decades, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1989, at 12-19.
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Both the executive board and the supervisory board are convinced that Deutsche Bank
must remain an independent and neutral publicly traded corporation in order to measure
up with its business objective and to be able to continue its present development, hence
that there should be no major shareholder with a dominating influence. 138

Although the recent takeover of Feldmiihle-Nobel AG and Pirelli S.p.A's
acrimonious fourteenth-month struggle to complete a reverse merger of its tire
business with Continental AG-one of the first-ever hostile corporate battles in
Germany and also one of the longest in Europe-have revealed the pseudo-safety
of the maximum voting right laid down in the bylaws, 139 there remains a deeprooted aversion to autocracy in corporate Germany. The universal language of
money is only rudimentarily understood in those circles.
V. Summary and Conclusion
Corporate America's annual meeting seasons of 1989 and 1990 witnessed a
remarkable renaissance of the old-fashioned proxy contest. 14 However, the proxy
contest is no longer an empty ritual in which shareholders routinely go along with
management as Edward J. Epstein suggested by comparing shareholder voting to
elections held by the Communist party of North Korea: "Except in the rarest of
cases, there is only one slate of directors running for office. Management controls
the voting process and counts the votes." 1 41 While Epstein's comment might have
been realistic at the time of its publication in 1986, it now must be viewed with
reservation. Shareholder proposals and proxy contests appear to be the only passable route for change of corporate control after the demise of the junk bond market
and of leveraged buy-outs in general. In addition, the proliferation in the United
States of state anti-takeover statutes (currently thirty-nine) and myriads of restrictive state court decisions have contributed to foreclosing the use of cash tender
offers as a vehicle for staging hostile takeovers. 142
Among the most visible proxy contests in the year 1990 sketched out above,
the confrontation between American General and Torchmark bears much resemblance to the earlier Gillette Corp. case in April 1988 where a dissident group
also put pressure on the management to accept "the possibility of a sale or
138. Schneider, supra note 13, at 326.
139. For the current discussion of the legal and economic validity, Uwe H. Schneider, Gesetzliches
Verbot fur Stimmrechtsbeschrankungenbei der Aktiengesellschaft?, 35 AG 56-63 (1990); Wolfgang

Zdllner & Ulrich Noack, One Share-One Vote?, 36 AG 117, 119 et seq. (1991) (in favor). But see
Michael Adams, H6chststimmrechte, Mehrfachstimmrechte und sonstige wundersame Hindernisse
auf dem Markt fuer Unternehmenskontrolle, 35 AG 63-78 (1990); Theodor Baums, Ho5chststim-

mrechte, 35 AG 221-42 (1990) (opposed). See also the comparative study, with emphasis on U.S.
securities and capital markets law, by Schneider, supra note 114, at 620-26.
140. William Meyers, Escalating the Proxy Wars, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1990, at 9597. Patricia Vowinkel, More Proxy Fights Seen as Takeover Funding Fades, REUTER Bus. REP.,

Mar. 14, 1990 (LEXIS, World Library, Allwld file).
141. EDWARD J. EPSTEIN, WHO OWNS THE COMIrATION?: MANAGEMENr VS. SHAREHOLDERS 13 (1986).
142. R. J. McCartney, New Takeover Tactic: Ballots Instead of Bonds, WASH. POST, Apr. 8,
1990, at HI.
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merger." 143 The four remaining incidents, Simmons versus Lockheed, Belzbergs
versus Armstrong, Icahn versus USX, and also BTR versus Norton that was
unfortunately timed at the end of the American takeover boom of the 1980s,
share the same factual pattern concisely summarized by Louis Lowenstein, professor of law at Columbia University School of Law: "The proxy fights are 'just
used as a cleaning-up of some of the unfinished business of the 1980s.' Investors
are 'trying to salvage what's left of a not-very-good investment.' '"144
Provided that this assessment is correct, that the sudden increase of proxy battles
constitutes a merely temporary phenomenon, institutional investors are best advised to join the various actions set in motion by the handful of financiers who
found themselves with unwanted minority stakes in companies when the money
market dried up. The latter's zeal and influence to make up their current paper
4 5
losses might be used as a spearhead to remove the "home-court advantage"1
of incumbent management. As soon as this specific goal of "a more level playing
field" 146 is achieved,' 47 such as by the setting-up of a communication network,
confidential voting, and prerogatives in the event of significant financial decisions,
the alliance of corporate management with the ill-reputed corporate raiders will
be halted. In fact, economics suggest that in the long run corporate raiders will
be eliminated. In the first place, their persistent perception of "huffing and puffing" 148 sends the wrong signal to the board of directors. The more activity the
institutional investors display in corporate monitoring, the more important it is that
shareholder-sensitive board members be secure in the "long-termism" of such
efforts, rather than laboring under the apprehension that their investors will bail
out overnight. 149 Furthermore, the gains from the fine-tuned realignment of institutional investors' and corporate managers' interests are not subject to sharing
with third parties because this would simply reduce the likelihood that any dis150
tributable gains will be generated.
The tighter monitoring of the board of directors will likely raise the eyebrows
of antitrust authorities, 1 51 if, for obvious efficiency reasons, the community of
143. Lowenstein & Millstein, supra note 18, at 744.
144. McCartney, supra note 142, at HI0.
145. Sherman, supra note 95, at 67 (quotation of Carl C. Icahn).
146. G. Davis, Comptroller of the State of California and a trustee of the state's public employee
pensions funds, quoted in J. M. Rosenberg, Annual Meetings: Chance for Institutional Investors to
Rock the Boat, The Associated Press, Apr. 12, 1990.
147. Because of "tilting the playing field in favor of management" the constitutionality of the
PBCL, supra note 30, was challenged by two lawsuits filed in the E.D. Pa., inter alia on behalf of
several Belzberg-affiliated entities, within minutes after its enactment. See Vindu P. Goel, Pennsylvania's New Anti-Takeover Law Fuels Controversy, Faces Fight in Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30,
1990, at A9A; see also sources cited supra note 31.
148. Nussbaum & Dobrzynski, supra note 63, at 104.
149. Charkham, supra note 74, at 769.
150. The interplay between equal treatment, fiduciary duty, and shareholder value is discussed at
length in Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 88, at 703 et seq.
151. Possible other sources of friction are: (i) compliance with disclosure requirements according
to the securities and exchange regulations; and (ii) the market perception of the institutional investors
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institutional investors initiates a corresponding concerted action. However, the
fear of such scrutiny cannot be justified. The greatest safeguard against collusion
is the role of fund managers as agents; they cannot delegate their specific fiduciary responsibility to any other group or individual. 152
Nonetheless, institutional investors have just as little ground for denying their
growing economic power as for concealing their frustration about the degree of
corporate influence. According to John C. Wilcox, managing director of Georgeson
& Co., a New York City based firm that specializes in advising companies locked
in takeover battles, this striking discrepancy is ripe for a radical change. He has
recently forecast, "Institutional investors will be the kingmakers in 1990." 153
With the benefit of hindsight, we can today say that this prognosis has proven
to be too optimistic. A whole string of factors hindered its fulfillment.
" the spontaneous appearance of state legislators in the corporate arena as
auxiliary troops of local target companies;
" the bad reputation of the central figures acting in the proxy contests that
from the onset prohibited any coalition;
* the avoidance of conflict by the resignation of incumbent management;
* the irresistible power of money; and
* the sports wisdom that you should never change a winning team. 154
If the institutional investors' time of triumph is still to come, it only implies
that putting off something does not mean the opportunity is gone forever. To the
contrary, the combination of proper circumstances is more likely to occur than
the fall in wealth of the institutional investors. Nevertheless, being labeled the
kingmakers must not be confused with being the rulers themselves. It does not
mean that institutions are going to start to manage corporate America or Germany, but it does mean that they are not going to be purely passive either. 155 It
appears as if the omnipresence and omnipotency of the institutional investors will
trigger the rapprochement of the U.S. corporate concept of separation of shareholders and managers and of the German model of codetermination. 156

as the second generation of corporate raiders. See Anise C. Wallace, Institutions' Proxy Power
Grows, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1988, at Dl.
152. Machold, supra note 102, at 755.
153. McCartney, supra note 142, at HI.
154. See Smith, supra note 54, at CI.
155. Black, supra note 23, at 570-75; Brett D. Fromson, The Big Owners Roar, FORTUNE, July 30,
1990, at 66; Douglas W. Hawes, United States: Role of Institutional Investors, 64 ScHWEIZERSCHE
ZEITscHRIFr FUR WIRTscHAFrsREcHTIREvUE SUISSE DE DRorr DES AiFAHZES [SZW/RSDA] 187, 188
(1990). But see the recent incisive criticism in Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)Significance
of InstitutionalShareholder Activism, 79 GEo. L.J. 445, 478-90 (1991) (applying rigorous collective
action and agency analyses to recent manifestations of institutional shareholder activism).
156. For a review of this proposal of hybridization, see K. BLEICHER ET AL., UNTERNEHMENSVERFASSUNG UND SPITZENORGANISATION: FutHRUNG UND UBERWACHUNG VON AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN
IM INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH passim (1989); Manuel R. Theisen, Dos Board-Modell: Lbsung-

sansatz zur Oberwindung der "UberwachungslUicke"
161, 167-68 (1989).
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